By Scott Rabe, Sam Schwartz-Fenwick, and Marlin Duro

Seyfarth Synopsis: In the first case following the Department of Justice’s pronouncement that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against transgender persons on the basis of gender identity, a court in the Western District of Oklahoma held that Title VII protects transgender individuals from discrimination. Tudor v. Se. Okla. State Univ., No. civ-15-324-C. (W.D. Okla. Oct. 26, 2017).

With the recent October 5, 2017 memorandum from the Department of Justice stating that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against transgender persons, the legal landscape regarding Title VII’s protection of transgender individuals is very much in flux. The DOJ’s interpretation is a reversal of the DOJ’s interpretation under the Obama administration and also conflicts with the current interpretation of the EEOC, both of which interpret Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity. U.S. Circuit courts are also split on the issue, meaning this issue is likely primed for resolution by the Supreme Court in the not too distant future.

The latest decision addressing this issue comes from Tudor v. Southeastern Oklahoma State University, a case from the Western District of Oklahoma in which Tudor, a transgender former professor at Southeastern Oklahoma State University, alleged among other things that she was harassed and discriminated against on the basis of her gender identity after she was denied tenure following her transition from male to female. The court in Tudor denied the university’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were triable issues of fact with respect to each of Tudor’s claims. This decision is important because it shows that, despite the DOJ’s memorandum, courts are still willing to extend Title VII protections to transgender persons. It also provides helpful guidance to employers as they ponder how their own internal policies and procedures affect transgender employees.

Importantly, the court in Tudor rejected the University’s argument that Tudor was not entitled to protection under Title VII because “transgender” is not a protected class. The court, relying on its prior ruling on the issue, reiterated that Title VII’s prohibition of gender discrimination extended to transgender individuals to the extent they were discriminated against based on “gender non-conformity.” Specifically, Tudor had alleged that Defendant’s actions towards her occurred because she was female, yet Defendants regarded her as male.

The Court also denied the University’s motion for summary judgment on Tudor’s hostile work environment claim, finding that there was a triable issue of fact. In particular, the court highlighted Tudor’s evidence that for four years the University placed restrictions on what restroom she could use, how she could dress, what makeup she could wear, and that it used the wrong pronouns when referencing her. The Court found that these facts, if true, could be sufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim.

The Court also rejected the University’s Faragher/Ellerth defense, which can provide a complete defense to an employer that has non-discrimination and non-harassment policies in place but where an employee fails to take advantage of those procedures. Here, the court explained that the defense would not apply because the University’s sexual harassment and sex discrimination policies did not contain specific language regarding protections for transgender employees.

Even though the law in this area remains uncertain, there is much for employers to glean from the Tudor case. First, it is clear that the DOJ’s recent memorandum has not resolved the question of whether Title VII protects transgender employers on the basis of gender identity. Therefore, employers should be vigilant in establishing and maintaining non-discrimination and anti-harassment policies that extend protections to individuals on the basis of gender identity. This will help ensure that employers stay compliant with federal (and applicable state and local) laws, and it also preserves a potential Faragher/Ellerth defense to a hostile work environment claim. Employers should also be mindful of the unique conduct that may be considered harassing in nature to transgender employees. For example, Tudor demonstrates that denying employees access to their bathroom of choice, enacting strict gender normative dress codes, and refusing to use preferred pronouns may all contribute to a hostile work environment. Thus, employers should update their anti-harassment policies and trainings to include examples that address some of the unique scenarios affecting transgender employees.

As always, we invite employers to reach out to their Seyfarth contact for solutions and recommendations regarding anti-harassment and EEO policies and addressing compliance with LGBT issues in the law.

By Esther Slater McDonald

Seyfarth Synopsis: In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must have a concrete injury to sue for FCRA violations. Following Spokeo’s remand, courts have held that consumers have standing to sue if their reports are inaccurate even if an inaccuracy did not adversely affect them.

In Spokeo, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that plaintiffs seeking to sue in federal court must have a concrete, actual injury; a mere statutory violation is not enough. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the plaintiff had alleged a concrete injury. (See our prior posts here, here, here, and here for a summary of the case background and a more detailed explanation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling.)

The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling on Remand

On remand, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled a concrete injury in fact and thus had standing to proceed with his FCRA claims. The court stated that, although a plaintiff may not show an injury-in-fact merely by pointing to a statutory violation, “some statutory violations, alone, do establish concrete harm.” To determine whether a statutory violation is itself a concrete injury, the court created a two-part test that asks (1) whether the statutory provision at issue was established to protect the consumer’s concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights), and, if yes, (2) whether the specific procedural violation alleged actually harmed or presented a material risk of harm to those interests.

On the first question, the Ninth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had alleged a violation of the FCRA’s requirement that a consumer reporting agency have reasonable procedures in place to ensure the maximum possible accuracy in reporting. The court concluded that this provision “protect[s] consumers’ concrete interests” in accurate reporting and consumer privacy and that these interests are “‘real’ rather than purely legal creations.” The court reasoned that “given the ubiquity and importance of consumer reports in modern life—in employment decisions, in loan applications, in home purchases, and much more—the real-world implications of material inaccuracies in those reports seem patent on their face.” The court also noted that “the interests that FCRA protects also resemble other reputational and privacy interests that have long been protected in the law.”

As to the second question, the Ninth Circuit stated that it required an “examination of the nature of the specific alleged reporting inaccuracies to ensure that they raise a real risk of harm to the concrete interests that the FCRA protects.” The court concluded that, while a benign inaccuracy may not be harmful, the plaintiff had raised a real risk of harm by alleging that the defendant had inaccurately reported that he was married, had children, was in his 50’s, was employed, had a graduate degree, and was financially stable. The court reasoned that this information “is the type that may be important to employers or others making use of a consumer report.”

The Ninth Circuit held that whether an employer or other end user considered the inaccurate information was irrelevant. Although the defendant argued that the plaintiff must show that the information actually harmed his employment prospects or presented a material or impending risk of doing so, the court disagreed. In the court’s view, “[t]he threat to a consumer’s livelihood is caused by the very existence of inaccurate information in his credit report and the likelihood that such information will be important to one of the many entities who make use of such reports.” Thus, a materially inaccurate report is itself a concrete injury.

Although the Ninth Circuit spoke of harm and materiality, the crux of the opinion appears to be that any inaccuracy will provide standing if it involves information that a user of a report may consider even if no one ever does consider it. And that is how one court recently interpreted the ruling.

In Alame v. Mergers Marketing, a judge in the Western District of Missouri held that a plaintiff had standing to sue because he alleged that the defendant’s reporting made it appear that he moved around a lot. The plaintiff’s background report included 22 address entries for him. Some of the address entries were for the same location but varied as to the formatting of the address. The plaintiff claimed that reporting formatting variations inaccurately conveyed that he had lived at 22 different locations. The plaintiff did not allege that anyone had interpreted the report that way or that he had not lived at those locations. Nonetheless, quoting Robins, the court held that a plaintiff is injured by “‘the very existence of inaccurate information in his credit report.’”

Potential Conflict with Spokeo and Dreher

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is difficult to reconcile with Spokeo. In Spokeo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to be sufficient, an injury must “actually exist” and clarified that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm” to a plaintiff. Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that an inaccurate report is itself a concrete injury even if the only people who received the report were the plaintiff and his lawyer. (The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant had furnished his report to anyone other than the plaintiff and his lawyer.)

The Ninth Circuit’s position also seems to conflict with the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Dreher v. Experian Information Solutions. In that case, the plaintiff sued a consumer reporting agency for inaccurately identifying the source of credit information in his report. The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the inaccuracy itself was an injury. Instead, the court held that a plaintiff must show that he “was adversely affected by the alleged error on his report.” The court reasoned that an inaccuracy “work[s] no real world harm” unless it has a negative impact on the consumer.

Implications for Businesses

Robins and Dreher indicate that the federal courts are still grappling with Spokeo’s meaning. We expect the issue will continue to percolate in the federal courts. If the divide on Spokeo’s application deepens among the federal courts of appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court may revisit the standing issue to provide more clarity.

For now, under Robins, consumers may be able to bring FCRA claims in federal court whenever their reports contain inaccurate information unless that information is truly benign, such as when an address contains a mistyped zip code. Even if a plaintiff lacks Article III standing under Dreher, he or she may be able to proceed in state court in jurisdictions that recognize broad standing to sue for any statutory violation.

For this reason, employers obtaining background checks should be careful to comply with each of the FCRA’s highly technical requirements. Failing to comply with a requirement could expose a company to class action liability even if the violation did not impact hiring. Employers should consider conducting a privileged compliance review of their background screening process, including the notices used and the procedures followed for obtaining and using background reports. Employers should also review their policies regarding requesting and using salary history and criminal history in light of the increasing number of jurisdictions that restrict use of such information and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s continued interest in background screening policies that may have a disparate impact on minorities.

If you have questions about these or other issues, please reach out to the author or your Seyfarth attorney.

 

By Christopher W. Kelleher, Rashal G. Baz, James L. Curtis, and Brent I. Clark,

Seyfarth Synopsis: On October 11, 2017, the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance that will require Chicago hotels to provide certain staff with “panic buttons” and develop enhanced anti-sexual harassment policies.

In an effort to protect hotel employees from sexual harassment and other guest-misconduct, Chicago has passed the Hotel Workers Sexual Harassment Ordinance, which requires Chicago hotels to provide employees who work alone in guest rooms or bathrooms with “a panic button or notification device” which can be used to call for help if the employee “reasonably believes that an ongoing crime, sexual harassment, sexual assault or other emergency is occurring in the employee’s presence.”

According to the Ordinance, “a panic button or notification device” is a portable device designed to be used in emergency situations to summon hotel security or other appropriate hotel staff to the employee’s location. The Ordinance does not require hotels to use a specific type of device, as long as it warns proper hotel personnel and it comes at no cost to the employee.

The Ordinance also requires hotels to develop and distribute a written policy to protect employees against sexual harassment. Specifically, the policy must: (1) encourage employees to promptly report sexual misconduct by guests; (2) describe procedures for handling the reported misconduct; (3) instruct the complaining employee to stop work and leave the dangerous area; (4) offer the employee temporary work assignments; (5) provide the employee with paid time off to make a complaint or testify as a witness; (6) inform employees of additional protections; and (7) include an anti-retaliation provision. The policy must be conspicuously posted in English, Spanish, and Polish.

The Ordinance authorizes fines of $250 – $500 for each day a violation continues, and two or more violations within any 12-month period may result in license suspension or revocation. Hotels will have until July 1, 2018 to implement “panic button” systems, but must comply with the Ordinance’s other provisions (i.e. develop and distribute an updated anti-sexual harassment policy) within 60 days of the law’s publication, which we can expect any day now.

Notably, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) uses the General Duty Clause  to enforce workplace issues against employers.  OSHA can rely on industry practices to support a claim that a “recognized hazard” exists. It is possible that OSHA will use the new Ordinance and employer compliance in Chicago as a basis to require that other hotel employers should also have “panic buttons.”

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team or the Workplace Safety and Health (OSHA/MSHA) Team.

By Mahsa Aliaskari

Seyfarth Synopsis:  Today’s post is by our colleague, Mahsa Aliaskari, Seyfarth Shaw LLP’s Senior Counsel. Mahsa has advised and defended businesses with up to 100,000+ nationwide employees on U.S. immigration compliance programs and practices.  She and Angelo A. Paparelli — along with former USCIS Director, Leon Rodriguez, noted worksite enforcement lawyer, Dawn Lurie, and Alexander Madrak, who recently joined Seyfarth from the Immigrant and Employee Rights Section in the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice — are part of Seyfarth’s Immigration Compliance Specialty Team, within the firm’s Immigration Group. Mahsa’s basic message is that, given the Administration’s focus on immigration worksite-enforcement, employers  — no matter how vigilant corporate leaders perceive their immigration compliance measures to be — must take nothing for granted.  Stop assuming and check things out.

Following a six year investigation, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) unit issued a statement confirming a guilty plea on September 28, 2017 by Asplundh Tree Experts, Co. (Asplundh) for unlawfully employing undocumented workers.  As part of the plea agreement, Asplundh received a sentence to pay a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of $80 million dollars, abide by an ICE HSI Administrative Compliance Agreement, and pay an additional $15 million dollars to satisfy civil claims arising out of their failure to comply with immigration law.  Prior to this, the often touted “record settlement” included IFCO Systems North America Inc.’s (IFCO) $20.7 million dollars from 2006.

While the facts of this case reveal the company to be an egregious violator, there are parts of this story that may ring true for many companies.  The story of Asplundh, similar to the stories of IFCO, Abercrombie and Fitch, Chipotle and many others, should serve as both an informative and cautionary tale. While each of these companies faced different challenges and immigration violations, the lessons in each should help general counsel and the C-suite at companies appreciate the importance of taking stock of their own practices and putting into motion an action plan designed to mitigate risks and liabilities where possible.  If nothing else, a judgment of $95 million solidifies that the Form I-9 is not really “just” a simple a form and the government can and will use a variety of tactics to enforce compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).

We also cannot bury our proverbial heads in the sand and ignore recent Executive Orders changing ICE’s immigration priorities-, and promoting “Buy American, Hire American” policies. While we have not yet seen the worksite raids we experienced under the Bush Administration or widespread “desk audits” or “silent raids” of Forms I-9 under the Obama administration, ICE is here for the long haul and future worksite investigations, on-site visits and Form I-9 audits can be expected.  This will be especially true as we see an increase in resources allocated to meet the current administration’s priorities in this arena.

The Story Behind Asplundh

Described as one of the largest privately-held companies in the United States, and headquartered in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, Asplundh is now also known as the company that pled to the largest civil settlement agreement ever levied on an immigration case – how did they get here?

ICE’s six – year investigation found that Asplundh employed a scheme where employees were hired and re-hired even when lower level managers were aware of the fact that the employees were not authorized to work in the United States.  But more importantly, the charges noted that “the highest levels of Asplundh management remained willfully blind.” Even before the September 28th announcement of the settlement agreement following the guilty plea, the Department of Justice (DOJ) U.S. Attorney’s Office announced on September 19, 2017 that three employees, including supervisors and a Vice- President, had already entered guilty pleas to felony counts of conspiracy to commit fraud and misuse visas  in connection with this case, with each defendant facing prison time and fines.

ICE Acting Director Thomas Homan stated in its September 28th announcement that  “[t]oday’s judgment sends a strong, clear message to employers who scheme to hire and retain a workforce of illegal immigrants: we will find you and hold you accountable. Violators who manipulate hiring laws are a pull factor for illegal immigration, and we will continue to take action to remove this magnet” (emphasis added).

The charge was for one count of unlawfully employing aliens. Statements from ICE and the (DOJ) U.S. Attorney’s Office describe a company practice where a decentralized hiring practice reinforced and supported the acceptance of fraudulent documentation presented to company representatives by new hires and re-hires in regions across the United States.  More specifically, as noted in ICE’s statement, the six year investigation revealed that from 2010 to 2014, “the company decentralized its hiring so Sponsors (the highest levels of management) could remain willfully blind while Supervisors and General Foremen (2nd and 3rd level supervisors) hired ineligible workers, including unauthorized aliens, in the field. Hiring was by word of mouth referrals rather than through any systematic application process. This manner of hiring enabled Supervisors and General Foremen to hire a work force that was readily available and at their disposal.”  The purported motivation for this national industry leader in tree trimming and brush clearance for power and gas lines – a motivated workforce willing and able to relocate at a national level as needed to respond to weather related events requiring Asplundh crews.

While details of the Administrative Compliance Agreement have not yet been released, given the charges and facts disclosed it is likely the company will be required to take action on a number of fronts.  As noted in the company’s own statement, Asplundh has already taken some corrective action, including:

  • Appointing a Compliance Specialist trained in fraudulent document identification in each Asplundh region nation-wide.
  • Revising hiring procedures to verify each identification examination for every new hire.
  • Investigating every complaint of potentially undocumented workers.
  • Retaining a third party consultant to review actions and procedures.
  • Presenting the company compliance program to ICE for review.

These corrective actions are reminiscent of what we saw with IFCO and changes that IFCO made in 2006 as part of its agreement with ICE.  Recent history has shown us ICE’s unwavering commitment to its investigations and enforcement of immigration laws regardless of the name or party controlling the Oval Office.

What Does This Mean for Your Operations?

The key for all employers is to take all necessary and possible steps that will protect the company from a charge and a subsequent finding of knowingly or intentionally hiring undocumented workers. While all employers may not be able to guarantee full compliance, everyone can and should take steps that will provide an affirmative defense against charges and allegations of willfully employing undocumented workers or simply being careless to the point that a good faith defense cannot be made.   From addressing proper form completion, document retention, remote hires, electronic I-9 vendors and detecting fraudulent documents, there are steps every company can and should take with minimal disruption to operations that can provide an affirmative defense in showing good-faith compliance with Form I-9 IRCA requirements.

Compliance with Form I-9 requirements should be a priority – not an option – for any U.S. employer. All employers, regardless of industry or size, must make a concerted effort to understand the importance of compliance, and make strategic business decisions to limit liability.  Investing the time and resources necessary to develop and implement proper immigration compliance policies and protocols should be on the agenda.  Businesses can begin taking a proactive approach and action on the following fronts:

  • Preventative Audits – Guided internal audits of I-9 documents, processes and procedures. Do this sooner rather than later and with guidance from experienced immigration compliance counsel. Whether you choose to conduct the audit yourself or retain counsel, the results of the audit will go a long way toward assessing exposure and limiting liability either in a “desk audit” or a full on investigation. Remember, if the company has been audited once, you are on the government’s radar with secondary inspections and active investigations a possibility.
  • Train, Train, Train – Human Resource teams and their delegates need to consistently and accurately complete Form I-9s.  Provide them with basic knowledge of the process and the tools to recognize fraudulent identity and work eligibility documents. To become and remain compliant with IRCA and other state and federal immigration regulations training and investment in the people responsible for this function is critical.
  • Improve or develop policies and procedures – Often we see issues relating to immigration compliance handled ad hoc, with larger entities taking a more “decentralized” approach. Time and again we see that leaving immigration compliance at the lowest rung of priorities increases risks and liabilities.  When the process is identifiable, then accountability can be, too.
  • Manage compliance – Policies and procedures do not mean anything without proper implementation and monitoring. Lack of compliance where immigration and IRCA mandates are concerned carries fines and penalties that includes prison terms for individuals.  For the company it can also mean a PR nightmare.  Dedicating top management level resources to oversee a company’s immigration compliance program should be a top consideration.
  • Prepare for possible workplace disruptions – Whether the current Administration steps up enforcement actions is not really the motivating factor.  As depicted in the excerpt below from the Department of Homeland Security – U.S. ICE Worksite Enforcement FY 2014 annual report, we have continually seen ICE conduct long, exhaustive investigations, with an increase in audits and related fines and penalties.  The following table reflects the number of opened and closed worksite enforcement investigations, criminal and administrative employee and employer arrests and the assessed fines and collections for each fiscal year from the annual report.

For more than sixteen years, since the infamous worksite raids under the Bush administration, we have watched enforcement actions increase regardless  of the party controlling the executive branch.  Whether a paticular form of enforcement action becomes more prevalent or not, should your company be investigated, severe losses could occur and planning for potential impacts on workforce availability in advance can prove to be critical to limiting disruption to ongoing operations.

As ICE investigations continue and potentially expand under Presidential Executive Orders or future Presidential Proclamations, it is more important than ever for employers to protect themselves by ensuring that proper immigration compliance policies are in place and in-house audits are conducted on a regular basis to detect potential issues and irregularities. As demonstrated in Asplundh, the stakes are high, employer responsibilities as well as liabilities under Title I, Part A of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) should be taken very seriously.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Immigration Team.

By James L. Curtis and Craig B. Simonsen

Seyfarth Synopsis:  A recent active shooter incident at an international airport illustrates both how quickly an incident may be over, yet how ancillary impacts take much longer to resolve. While the shooter was apprehended in less than two minutes, the international airport was shut down for most of a full day, impacting over 500 employees and 10,000 customers, and 20,000 personal items were lost.  The after-action report offers some lessons learned.

At the World Safety Organization International Environmental and Occupational Safety and Health Symposium last month, William G. Thompson, IV, the Occupational Safety & Health Manager and Safety Management System Administrator at Broward County Aviation Department, including the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (Airport), presented the findings from the January 6, 2017 active shooter incident at the Airport.  Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport Active Shooter Incident and Post-Event Response January 6, 2017 After-Action Report (August 15, 2017) (Report or Findings).  Thompson was at the Airport that day, watched the events unfold, and cooperated in the resolution and the preparation of the Report.

The Report indicates that “on January 6, 2017, a lone gunman intentionally discharged a firearm at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport killing five and wounding six innocent bystanders.  Approximately 90 minutes after the initial incident, speculation of additional firearms discharged in other areas within [the Airport] caused panic and led to a chaotic self-evacuation of persons throughout the airport.”  The Report states that it was developed in accordance with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.  Specifically, the Report analyzes the response, the emergency and operational coordination, and the facility recovery and post event activities.

Factually, the Report shows that the actual shooting event, in the Terminal 2 baggage area,  lasted less than 80 seconds and ended when the “perpetrator ran out of ammunition, laid down on the ground, and surrendered to law enforcement officers at the scene.”  Of the eleven people who were shot, six (6) were wounded, and five (5) were killed.  Approximately 40 others were injured in the panic during the initial shooting event (First Incident). Terminals 1, 3, and 4 remained operational at this time.

The Second Incident started at approximately an hour and a half later, when radio communications indicated unsubstantiated reports of additional shots fired in Terminal 1, and one of the parking garages. As a result, the “response among passengers, tenants, and airport employees triggered uncontrolled and unmanaged self-evacuation of personnel, many of whom ran into secured areas and onto active aprons. Some received minor injuries during the self-evacuation.”  Because of the breach of restricted areas on the airfield during the self-evacuation, and the ongoing investigation of the actual crime scene in Terminal 2, law enforcement began sweeping and clearing each of the four (4) terminals at the Airport to ensure that all areas were clear of any threats and to re-establish secure areas.

Because of the incurrence into secure zones, the FAA issued a ground stop notice closing the Airport to all but emergency flights.  Subsequently, airport operations were officially terminated and all airport roadways were closed to incoming traffic.  Law enforcement continued clearing the rest of the airport until approximately 8:30 PM, over seven hours later. The airport remained closed for the remainder of the day, but reopened to commercial flights early the following day.

This incident provides a good reference for business to consider in developing their own corporate active shooter programs.  For instance, in this case responding airport employees were initially denied access to areas to which access was required to support response operations.  In addition, while the actual shooting incident was over in ninety seconds, during the subsequent response approximately 500 airport employees were interrupted in their jobs, and 10,000 passengers were bused to a nearby facility for food and shelter, and to assist them in connecting to other means of transportation “As result of the chaos that ensued following the shooting, more than 20,000 personal items were left unclaimed at the airport.”  The active shooter incident response must be planned for as well as the incident itself.

The Report provides “Lessons Learned,” including several points to support preparedness within the aviation sector and among aviation stakeholders.  Many of their recommendations are well placed in any industry:

  • Ongoing periodic incident command system training and exercises, support capabilities-based planning, coordination with airport stakeholders, and development of competencies among airport personnel to support critical incident response.
  • Airport emergency plans should be updated and reviewed at least annually or when changes in resources, personnel, or threats occur.
  • Airport emergency plans and/or companion response plans should address a full range of hazards and threats, identify a concept of operations in an incident command system context, and address all areas of the airport including public areas and auxiliary properties, such as rental car facilities.
  • Building relationships with external response partners through advanced planning, training and exercises is vital to support a common understanding of roles, responsibilities, resources, facility design and layout, and communication procedures under single or unified command conditions.
  • Coordination between airports and jurisdictional (city/county/state) emergency management agencies supports emergency response operations through effective communications, resourcing and resource management.
  • Airports should consider developing a written description of airport operations and airport physical layout specifically for external emergency responders who may respond to airport emergencies. Periodic tours for external emergency responders are also recommended to support an effective understanding of resources, evacuation plans, and other potential response needs.
  • Exercises conducted at airports should include active shooter scenarios as well as other locally-relevant hazard and threat scenarios identified local emergency management agencies).

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Workplace Safety and Health (OSHA/MSHA) Team.

By Erin Dougherty Foley and Craig B. Simonsen

Seyfarth Synopsis: In this case a home-care nurse complained about the quality of care her patient received from the patient’s family members. Subsequent review and inspections by the company found some “serious problems” with the employee’s care-giving — and ultimately led to her termination. The Sixth Circuit Court agreed with the employer’s analysis. Blair v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., No. 17-5025 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017).

The plaintiff, Teresa Blair, was a home-care nurse that provided medical care for a patient with cerebral palsy and mental retardation. Over the course of several years the plaintiff, as directed by her employer, reported numerous incidences of neglect of the home-care patient at the hands of the patient’s family. Blair complained that the patient’s mother was not mentally capable of caring for him.

Blair, though, exhibited her own employment issues on the job. According to the Court, Blair had shown up at a patient’s house when not scheduled to work; made errors on medical charts; failed to take a patient’s vital signs for the doctor; falsely reported that the doctor had ordered a patient quarantined and that Blair alone should care for the patient while he had the flu; and attempted to change her schedule without her supervisor’s permission.

Subsequently, Blair reported upon arriving at her home-care position, finding her patient in distress. After alerting authorities, Blair was told to call an ambulance. After arriving at the hospital, a doctor evaluated the patient and noted “normal vital signs and no clinical signs of illness or distress.” Blair’s supervisor told her to turn her patient’s care over to the hospital staff. Blair however continued to shadow hospital staff until that evening. The patient was released from the hospital the next day.

About a week later, the employer gave Blair a written warning indicating that she had failed to follow her supervisor’s instructions to let the hospital staff take over, among other things.

Then, after Blair’s patient’s release from the hospital, one of Blair’s supervisors and a registered nurse, visited the patient’s home and noted some “serious problems” with Blair’s care-giving. For instance, Blair had not placed a pulse-oximeter probe on the patient’s finger, which was a problem because “the doctor (and Blair’s supervisor) had ordered continuous use of the probe to measure [the patient’s] blood-oxygen saturation level.” Blair had also failed to place an ambu-bag at the patient’s bedside. “This device was supposed to be within arm’s reach so that, in an emergency, Blair could use it to help [the patient] breathe. The device was found in a closet on an upper shelf and the closet door was blocked by a large piece of equipment. “A month before, Blair had been reprimanded for the same mistake.” Blair was fired the next day.

Blair then sued the employer in Kentucky state court, asserting wrongful-discharge claims. The employer then removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Blair amended her claims to assert that the healthcare employer had discharged her in violation of Kentucky’s Patient Safety Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims.

In discussion of the law in this case, the Court explained that the Kentucky Patient Safety Act requires that any “employee of a health care facility . . . who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the quality of care of a patient, patient safety, or the health care facility’s or service’s safety is in jeopardy” to “make an oral or written report of the problem to the health care facility[.]” Citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216B.165(1). In addition, the Act also prohibits any “health care facility or service” from retaliating “against any agent or employee who in good faith reports[.]” Citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216B.165(3). To prevail on her claim under the Act, Blair needed to show (i) that she engaged in a protected activity under the Act, (ii) that the employer knew about her protected activity, and (iii) that the employer took an adverse employment action against her because of it.

Blair contended that a jury could find causation because in her view the employer falsely accused her of interfering with the Kentucky Protective Services investigation of the December 2013 incident that sent her patient to the hospital. The Court, though, concluded that Blair failed to present a genuine issue as to causation. “The 18 days between her complaint and termination are not enough to allow a reasonable jury to find that one caused the other.”

For employers, and especially healthcare employers, this case illuminates the need for constant vigilance in the company’s oversight of its staff, and the preparation of documentation relating to employee supervision and discipline.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Health Care Practice Group or the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

 

By: Christine Hendrickson, Lisa L. Savadjian, Cameron A. Smith, Courtney Stieber

Seyfarth Synopsis: The New York City Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) recently issued additional guidance in the form of “Frequently Asked Questions” on the Salary History Law that goes into effect on October 31, 2017.  

New York City’s Salary History Law goes into effect on October 31, 2017.  It will prohibit covered employers from inquiring about a candidate’s salary history, or relying on the salary history of candidates when determining their salary, benefits, or other compensation.  For more information regarding the law, see our prior alerts here, here, and here.

With the Halloween deadline fast approaching, many employers are revising their hiring practices to comply with the law.  Recently, the Commission issued guidance, which can be found on its website in a section entitled: “Frequently Asked Questions,” and here. The FAQs respond to some key concerns employers have about the law.

Key Takeaways

  • The FAQs provide guidance regarding deferred compensation and unvested equity. They clarify that, as part of a discussion about compensation expectations, employers can ask about the value and structure of deferred compensation or equity that would be forfeited.
  • The Commission takes an expansive view regarding the geographic scope of the law’s coverage, and will apply the law to job applicants that live in New York City and interview in New York City, even if they apply for a job outside of New York City.
  • The FAQs state that employers and consumer reporting agencies must comply with the law’s requirements even when running a background check, and suggest that it is a best practice to redact or exclude salary history from such reports.
  • Employers should remove all requests for current or prior salary on their job applications, particularly where it might be sent to a candidate for a job in New York City.
  • The Commission will conduct a case-by-case analysis regarding inquiries about the salary history of independent contractors and whether the employer may consider salary history when determining compensation for an offer of permanent employment in the same position or a comparable position. The Commission will primarily consider whether the temporary employee or subcontractor qualifies as an applicant for a new position or for internal transfer or promotion.

General Scope of Coverage

There were no big surprises on the scope of coverage.

  • The FAQs reaffirm that the law covers applicants for jobs in New York City.  The Commission acknowledges that the law will not apply where an applicant simply resides in New York City, but is interviewed and will work outside of New York City.  However, the FAQs indicate that the Commission is taking the position that if the employer asks a candidate about salary history during a job interview that occurs in New York City, even for a job based outside of the City, the law may apply.  Here, the Commission relies on the theory that the impact of the discriminatory conduct occurred in New York City.  Courts may take a narrower view when analyzing the locus of the impact of the challenged conduct and if the law applies in this situation.  Nonetheless, even employers without operations in New York City should exercise caution, particularly when interviewing in or considering applicants from New York City.
  • The law generally will not apply to former employers who disclose information about salary history to the hiring employer.  However, the Commission noted that others can be held liable if they intentionally aid and abet a violation of the law.
  • Applicants for internal transfer or promotion are not protected by the Salary History Law.
  • The salary history protections will go into effect on October 31, 2017, but they will not be retroactive to cover inquiries made prior to that date.  Nonetheless, employers should exercise caution if they are formulating or communicating offers after October 31st based on salary history obtained prior to that date.  Even if the information was lawfully obtained before the law went into effect, the law independently prohibits reliance on salary history in determining a candidate’s compensation, including the negotiation of a contract.

What Employers Can and Cannot Do to Learn About Applicants’ Salary Expectations

  • The Commission confirmed that a job application can ask an applicant to state his or her compensation expectations, as long as it does not request salary history.
  • Employers should review and revise their job applications, particularly where one might be sent to a candidate applying for a job in New York City, to remove all requests for current or prior salary.  Retaining or including a question on a job application that asks for salary history may violate the law.  Employers who use an application that requests salary history cannot avoid liability simply by adding a disclaimer stating that individuals in New York City or applying for jobs in New York City need not answer the application’s question about current or prior salary.
  • Inquiries made to a candidate’s current or former employers, or searching public records, for the purpose of learning an applicant’s salary history, are prohibited.  However, in cases of accidental discovery if, for example, an employer stumbles upon a candidate’s salary history while searching publicly available information for another purpose, the employer would not have violated the Salary History Law.  In such a situation, however, the employer may not rely on that accidentally discovered salary history to formulate the compensation details of an offer.
  • If an applicant volunteers information about his or her salary history without being prompted to do so, the employer may discuss and inquire about the applicant’s salary history, verify the applicant’s representations, and rely on the applicant’s salary history in determining an offer.
  • A voluntary disclosure of salary history is “without prompting” if the average job applicant would not think that the employer encouraged the disclosure based on the overall context and the employer’s words or actions.  While the Commission is articulating an objective “reasonable person” test, rather than a subjective standard, this “voluntary and without prompting” safe harbor remains vague.  Employers should exercise caution and train hiring managers and recruiting professionals not to prompt disclosure of salary history.

Background Checks and the Implications of the Credit Reporting Laws

  • In circumstances where an employer is legally permitted to perform a background check before a conditional offer has been made, or runs a background check after a conditional offer, the Commission recommends that employers specify to reporting agencies that information about salary history be excluded from the report.  Inquiries into salary history would violate the law regardless of whether such inquiries are made before or after a conditional offer, unless the employer makes the inquiry to verify information the applicant disclosed voluntarily and without prompting.
  • Consumer Reporting Agencies (“CRA”) should consider no longer verifying salary information for applicants in New York City or applicants for jobs in New York City.  In addition, where CRAs collect W-2 or other tax reporting forms from candidates, they should redact salary history.

Broad Definition of “Compensation”

  • The Commission has defined “salary” broadly.  The same is true of “benefits” and “other compensation,” which extend to various forms of remuneration, including, but not limited to, a car allowance, retirement plan, or bonus.  This also includes commissions an applicant earned.
  • An employer is allowed to ask about objective indicators of performance such as a book of business, or the volume, production, value, or frequency of sales.  However, an employer should not ask about an applicant’s current or former profit percentages, or information from which it can determine the applicant’s compensation earned on production or commissions (unless the applicant volunteered that information without prompting).
  • Employers may ask about the value of a counter offer or competing offer that the candidate might also be considering, because it is not “current or prior” salary.

Deferred Compensation

  • One of the most significant pieces of guidance contained in the FAQs concerns deferred compensation.  In September, the Commission’s policy counsel represented to us that it would take the position that employers should not affirmatively ask candidates whether they have deferred compensation or would forfeit deferred compensation.  The Commission stated that if the candidate offers information about deferred compensation as part of a discussion about compensation expectations, the employer can verify the value of the deferred compensation that would be forfeited, either with the prior employer or with the candidate.  However, when the Commission issued Fact Sheets in September, they were silent on deferred compensation.
  • The FAQs now state clearly that, in the context of a discussion with candidates to learn about their compensation expectations, employers may ask whether an applicant will have to forfeit deferred compensation or unvested equity upon resignation from his or her current employer, and may ask about the value and structure of the deferred compensation or unvested equity that would be forfeited.  Employers may request documentation to verify the applicant’s representations, and consider such information in making an offer.

Exemptions to the Law

  • There is no specific exemption in the law for actions taken by an employer pursuant to foreign or international law that specifically authorizes the disclosure or verification of salary history or requires knowledge of salary history.
  • Private positions for which compensation is set pursuant to procedures established by collective bargaining are not exempt. The only exemption in this area applies to public employees where compensation is set pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
  • Headhunters are not exempt.  Headhunters who qualify as employers, employment agencies, or agents of an employer may be liable under a direct or aiding and abetting discrimination theory.  The Commission recommends that headhunters obtain written confirmation from job candidates that they consent to disclosure of their salary history.  Employers working with headhunters should also obtain a copy of the applicant’s written consent before relying on a headhunter’s representations about an applicant’s salary history.
  • The Commission did little to clarify the debate surrounding independent contractors.  The law does apply to independent contractors.  However, the Commission hedged on whether an employer may consider the salary history of a temporary employee or a subcontractor in determining compensation for an offer of permanent employment in the same position or a comparable position.  The Commission stated that this must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The Commission will consider whether the temporary employee or subcontractor qualifies as an applicant for a new position or for internal transfer or promotion.  The Commission suggests that if the employer is willing to concede that it is a joint employer of the subcontractor or temporary employee, then the application may be one for internal transfer or promotion, which would not be covered by the law.

Corporate Acquisitions

  • A company seeking to acquire another company may obtain salary information about the employees of the target company as part of the due diligence process because the employees of the target company are not “job applicants” under the law.
  • However, despite this corporate acquisition exemption, the FAQs explain that if employees of the target company are being asked to interview for new positions in the acquiring company, the law may apply.  Accordingly, in those circumstances, the Commission recommends that any salary information that may have been shared in the due diligence process not be shared with hiring managers making decisions about compensation.  Employers considering a corporate acquisition should assess the law’s potential applicability.

Best Practices

The Commission recommends as a best practice:

  • During the hiring process, focus questions on applicants’ salary demands, skills, and qualifications.
  • Employers and hiring managers change the tenor of the conversation around salary discussions in interviews, to move away from what the applicant is currently making, and instead focus on his or her salary demand. The Commission believes this is an important change to prevent current salary from being based on prior salary, which may be artificially depressed.
  • Ensure that job applications and other forms do not include questions about applicants’ salary history, even if such questions are framed as “voluntary.”
  • Modify written policies and educate interviewers and hiring staff to prohibit inquiries about applicants’ salary history.

Unintentional violations of the law may lead to imposition of civil penalties of up to $125,000, and the Commission may impose a penalty of up to $250,000 for a willful and malicious violation. Individual applicants may also file claims under the New York City Human Rights Law for violation of the Salary History Law, and seek compensatory damages and other relief including punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.

As always, we are available to answer any questions employers may have regarding the Salary History Law.  If they have not done so already, employers should evaluate and reassess their practices and procedures with respect to recruiting and hiring in light of this new law and guidance.

By Sam Schwartz-Fenwick, Michael W. Stevens, and Kylie Byron

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Department of Justice has reversed the previous Administration’s position on employment protections for transgender individuals, and issued a memorandum that will likely be relied on by private employers seeking to use their religious faith to engage in otherwise prohibited discriminatory conduct.

In a bombshell week, with significant implications for employers, the Department of Justice issued two memos setting forth its views on transgender discrimination claims and an employer’s ability to make decisions based on its religious beliefs.

On October 5th, 2017, the Department of Justice released a memorandum stating that the new position of the DOJ would be that Title VII does not protect transgender persons from discrimination in the workplace. However, somewhat confusingly, the memo specified that transgender people were still protected under Title VII’s existing formulation. This presumably means that a transgender person may sue under Title VII if their employer discriminates against them on the basis of their race or country of origin, but not on the basis of sex or gender identity. The DOJ had previously argued in Court that Title VII does not extend to claims of sexual orientation discrimination.

On October 6th, 2017, the Department issued new guidance providing that “[e]xcept in the narrowest of circumstances, no one should be forced to choose between living out his or her faith and complying with the law.” The directive explicitly states that private companies must be given the same leeway regarding religious beliefs that churches receive. This guidance may impact hiring, and could possibly give any private organization the ability to hire, fire, and discipline employees based upon the faith of the owner or supervisor. It may also lead to changes in benefit plans that expressly exclude on religious grounds transgender coverage and/or same-sex spousal benefit.

These directives were not unexpected. Nonetheless, they mark a sharp reversal of DOJ policy. Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ had held the position that transgender employees were protected from discrimination under Title VII, congruent with the EEOC’s position. Specifically, the Department’s position was that gender identity discrimination was a form of sex stereotyping and thus covered by under Title VII. The DOJ intervened in litigation throughout the country advocating this view of the statute. Likewise, the prior administration argued in Hobby Lobby v Burwell, that private companies cannot claim exemption on religious grounds from generally applicable statutes.

In addition, the DOJ’s new course puts it at odds with the EEOC. The EEOC continues to advocate for a broad interpretation of Title VII that extends to claims of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.   Further it remains the EEOC’s position that a business cannot defend otherwise discriminatory conduct by arguing such conduct was consistent with its religious beliefs.

The memos underscore that this is an area of law filled with uncertainty. The law on the scope of Title VII’s coverage, and the ability of religion to act as an affirmative defense to otherwise discriminatory conduct, remain unsettled. The memos do not resolve the issue. The Department of Justice has stated its viewpoint and direction, but these directives do not supersede state or federal law already in place. Further, these memos do not control the position of the EEOC.

It is anticipated that these memos will lead to an increase in targeted employment lawsuits from impact groups. How such cases will turn out is unknown.

What is known is that these issues will remain in flux until either the Supreme Court hears the issue or Congress passes clarifying legislation. This term, the Supreme Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop will be given the opportunity to provide some insight into how it views the tension between religious rights and principles of non-discrimination. The case involves whether or not a business (here a bakery) is permitted to refuse service to same-sex couples on the basis of the business-owner’s faith. The baker asserts a First Amendment rights to religious liberty and freedom of speech. A ruling in favor of the baker would be consistent with the DOJ’s October 6 memo, and could dramatically change the employment law landscape. As with the DOJ memo, such a ruling could be relied on by employers and plan sponsors to justify otherwise discriminatory actions in hiring, promotion, firing and plan design.

As the policy change by the DOJ is not binding, it is not advisable to shift employment policies based upon the Attorney General’s statements. Treating transgender employees with equality in the workplace is a best practice standard that increases employee safety and productivity and helps with recruitment, retention and morale. Further, inclusive policies mitigate against the risk of potential litigation. In addition, several states and cities have protective statutes that prohibit discrimination against transgender people in employment, and federal courts in multiple jurisdictions have found transgender claims covered by Title VII.

For more information on this topic, or for advice or assistance in helping your workplace comply with best practices for transgender employees, please contact the authors, your Seyfarth Attorney, or any member of Seyfarth Shaw’s Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By Pamela Q. Devata and Jennifer L. Mora

Seyfarth Synopsis: In the last three years, employers have seen a sharp increase in the number of employment class actions under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Most of the reported cases involve challenges to the employer’s procedures before ordering a background report. More recently, however, we are seeing more cases against employers alleging a failure to follow the FCRA’s adverse action requirements, which must be followed any time an employer intends to take “adverse action” (revoking a job offer or terminating employment) against a job applicant or a current employee based, in whole or in part, on information contained in their background report.

A recent federal court decision demonstrates the importance of employers following these highly technical requirements when using background reports for hiring and other employment decisions. In Wright v. Lincoln Prop. Co., a judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered how an employer can comply with the adverse action process if it relies on an initial background report before revoking a job offer, but then receives a subsequent, corrected report. In Wright, the plaintiff received an employment offer that was contingent upon successful completion of a background check. The first background report, dated June 6, was a partial, in-progress report that revealed a misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence and two separate drug-related felony convictions. A week later, on June 13, a more comprehensive, final report was provided to the employer, but it included the same substantive criminal information. The employer sent the partial June 6 report to the plaintiff but did not send the final, completed June 13 report.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. In alleging the employer violated the FCRA, the plaintiff raised two arguments. First, he argued he never “received” a copy of the June 6 report. The court summarily rejected this argument, concluding the FCRA does not explicitly require an employer “to ensure that the consumer to whom the report relates actually received the notice.” Instead, the FCRA merely requires the employer to “provide” a copy of the report. Thus, the court concluded that a jury had to decide whether the employer satisfied its obligations under the FCRA based on its evidence that it did, in fact, “provide” him with a copy of the report.

The plaintiff then argued the June 6 report did not satisfy the FCRA because it did “not contain the required information, including a summary of rights and advance notice of [the employer’s] intention to withdraw its job offer based on the report.” He also argued the employer relied on the June 13 report (which was never provided to him) and, thus, sending the June 6 report did not satisfy the FCRA. On the other hand, the employer argued in its motion that dismissal of the claim was appropriate because (a) it provided the plaintiff with a copy of the report and the FCRA summary of rights and (2) the convictions, which were listed in both reports, were not erroneous and, in fact, the plaintiff to admitted to them.

The court concluded that a jury should resolve the dispute. In so doing, the court noted that the employer revoked the offer because of the convictions listed in both reports and that while there were no material differences between the criminal history included in the two reports, the final, June 13 report “contain[ed] a more thorough summary of other types of searches run by [the background check company], such as credit report” and the plaintiff “remained unable to contest the full information upon which [the employer] relied even if he indeed received the June 6th transmittal, given that it only included his criminal history.” Because a copy of the final report was not sent to the plaintiff, the court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment.

The court’s ruling does not equate to a blanket requirement that an employer provide all copies of background reports to rejected job applicants or terminated employees. It is possible the jury will find that, under these facts, a second pre-adverse action notice was not required. That said, employers that receive corrected or more comprehensive reports after sending the initial report should assess the new report to determine whether to send a subsequent pre-adverse action notice. As this case reflects, that both reports contained the same conviction information that caused the employer to revoke the offer did not spare the employer from the expense and burden of a jury trial.

Now more than ever, employers that conduct background checks, whether pre-hire or during employment, should consider taking steps to ensure they are complying with the FCRA’s notice requirements, including a privileged review of their background check process documents and notices and the procedures used when ordering background reports and relying on them when making employment decisions. Employers also should be mindful of other laws impacting their use of criminal history information, including the “ban-the-box” laws sweeping the nation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s interest in background screening policies that may have a disparate impact on minority workers.

Those with questions about these issues or topics are encouraged to reach out to the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Background Screening Compliance & Litigation Team.

Co-authored by Noah A. Finkel, David S. Baffa, and Andrew L. Scroggins

 

Seyfarth Synopsis: Following oral argument, employers should be cautiously optimistic that the Supreme Court will allow mandatory arbitration programs containing waivers of the ability to bring collective and class actions.

In Monday’s oral argument, in one of the most significant employment law cases we have seen in some time, a divided Supreme Court appeared more likely than not to give the green light to employers’ mandatory arbitration programs that contain waivers of collective and class actions. Our summary of the issues this case presents can be found here: http://www.wagehourlitigation.com/arbitration-agreements/will-the-supreme-court-finally-remove-doubt-that-an-employer-can-mandate-that-employees-enter-into-arbitration-agreements-with-class-waivers/

Reading tea leaves from oral argument is always a challenge, especially for those who have a stake in the matter.[1] But the three authors of this post attended Monday’s argument and, judging from the questions from the Court, the various Justices’ reactions to the answers to those questions, and the prior rulings from the Court, are optimistic that the Court ultimately will issue a closely-contested ruling in favor of class waivers.

Four Justices Appear Ready to Invalidate Class Waivers in Employment Cases

While our prediction is somewhat uncertain, there is one aspect in which we are completely confident: there will not be a unanimous decision. Indeed, it appeared that there are four solid votes to hold that Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides an employee with a right to bring a collective or class action, that requiring an employee to waive that right as a condition of employment violates NLRA Section 8’s prohibition against employer restraint of that right, and that, therefore, an employer’s arbitration agreement including a class waiver cannot be enforced either because the class waiver is illegal or because the NLRA constitutes a contrary congressional command to the general rule that, under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration agreements are to be enforced according to their terms.

Justice Ginsburg asserted in her questions that “the driving force of the NLRA was the recognition that there was an imbalance, that there was no true liberty of contract,” which is why concerted activity — including, in her apparent view, class and collective action — is protected against employer interference. She further contended that the Court’s prior precedents regarding the FAA concerned only commercial contracts and did not involve NLRA rights. (As the employers’ counsel Paul Clement rightly pointed out, however, the Court has twice reviewed the propriety of arbitration agreements between employers and employees, and neither time did the Court reason that arbitration agreements in the employment context are entitled to any less weight than those in the commercial context.)

Justice Kagan relied on the Court’s prior precedent to argue that the NLRA protects “employees seeking to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums” and thus implied that filing a class action also is protected by the NLRA. But the employers’ counsel retorted that Court precedent merely protects “resort to” courthouses, and that “there is no right to proceed as a class once you get there.” Once in court, nothing prohibits an employer from asserting all available defenses to class treatment, including moving to enforce an agreement between an employer and employee to arbitrate all disputes on a bilateral basis.

Justice Sotomayor questioned that argument by maintaining that an employer cannot enforce a contract that is “illegal” even under the FAA. In response to that, employers’ counsel Clement retorted that the Court has decided two other cases (Circuit City v. Adams and Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp.) in which employees had agreed to bilateral arbitration and in which it could have been argued that the NLRA makes such an agreement unlawful. “But no dog barked at that point . . . and that’s because the NLRA in no other context extends beyond the workplace to dictate the rules of the forum,” Clement told the Court.

The most vigorous questioner was Justice Breyer, who appeared offended by the idea of a class waiver. He went so far as to say that he is worried that the employers’ position “is overturning labor law that goes back to, for FDR at least, the entire heart of the New Deal” and that “I haven’t seen a way that you can, in fact, win the case, which you certainly want to do, without undermining and changing radically what has gone back to the New Deal.” Clement explained, however, that “for 77 years” — from the passage of the NLRA until its 2012 D.R. Horton decision — “the [NLRB] did not find anything incompatible about Section 7 and bilateral arbitration agreements” and the NLRB’s General Counsel issued a memorandum on the issue in 2010 in which it found that a mandatory class waiver does not violate the NLRA.

But From Where Does the 5th Vote Come?

Despite these fairly clear votes to invalidate class waivers, four votes does not a majority make.  And in questioning of counsel for the NLRB and counsel for the employees, it appeared that it will be difficult to find that fifth vote. Justice Thomas, in keeping with his usual demeanor, did not ask a question, but he has been in the Court’s majority in other cases enforcing arbitration agreements and is regarded as generally receptive to employer’s views. Nor did Justice Gorsuch ask a question. He, however, thus far has joined the Court’s conservative majority in all decisions in which he has been a part.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito clearly were skeptical of the NLRB’s position. Indeed, in questioning its General Counsel Richard Griffin, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito led Griffin into a significant admission, providing the most dramatic moment of the morning. They asked Griffin a series of questions that led Griffin to agree that it would not be an unfair labor practice for a mandatory arbitration program to require use of a forum whose rules did not allow class arbitration. Justice Alito quickly realized the significance of this point: “if that’s the rule, you have not achieved very much because, instead of having an agreement that says no class, no class action, not class arbitration, you have an agreement requiring arbitration before the XYZ arbitration association, which has rules that don’t allow class arbitration.” Griffin did not dispute this.  He commented that “the provisions of the [NLRA] run to prohibitions against employer restraint.”

Interestingly, counsel for the employees, Daniel Ortiz of the University of Virginia School of Law, did not agree with that concession, thus highlighting fundamental dissent from the NLRB’s position. These cases at the Supreme Court already were notable because the Solicitor General took a position opposite that of the NLRB. Oral argument added another layer of disagreement: even the employees urging the Court to adopt the Board’s view of the NLRA don’t agree with the concession made by Griffin. In other words, the employees and the NLRB are asking the Supreme Court to recognize a right that overrides the FAA, but they cannot agree on what that right is.

As in any close case recently at the Supreme Court, most eyes were on the swing vote, Justice Kennedy. Going into the argument, he appeared to be the Justice most likely to join Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer, the four justices who dissented from the Court’s enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement in the consumer context in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. Justice Kennedy did not tip his hand as much as the other Justices. But he did appear to be interested in the concession that NLRB General Counsel Griffin made (and clarified Chief Justice Roberts’ question that induced that concession), and his questioning of the Board and the employees’ counsel suggested that he believed that, even with a collective and class action waiver, employees still can exercise Section 7 rights in various ways, and that he did not wish to “constrain[] employers in the kind of arbitration agreements they can have.”

Little of the argument focused on the FAA and the nature of its saving clause or what constitutes a “contrary congressional command.” The Justices seemed more interested in exploring whether the NLRA contains a right to a class action in the first place.

What Next?

Our predicted close victory for the employers is just that: a prediction. After all, even the Justices who appeared to favor permitting class waivers did not strongly signal how they might reach that result or whether any guidelines or restrictions might accompany the rule. We do not recommend that employers bank on our prediction, because one never knows what is in the minds of the Justices or how they will come out after discussing the cases with each other. Until a decision is issued — which likely will be early 2018 — there will be no definitive answer as to whether a class waiver in an arbitration program provides a defense to an employment class or collective action. Employers should continue to consider whether an arbitration program with a class or collective action waiver is right for them and, if it is, be ready to implement one if the Supreme Court rules in the employers’ favor in these cases.

[1] Seyfarth Shaw LLP is counsel for Epic Systems Corporation — one of the three companies whose arbitration programs are at issue in the three consolidated cases at the Supreme Court — and represents Epic at the district court in this case, was counsel for Epic in the appellate court, and is co-counsel for Epic at the Supreme Court.  The views expressed in this blog post are Seyfarth Shaw’s and not necessarily those of Epic.