By Gina Gi and Daniel Whang

Seyfarth Synopsis: In Steven Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, 114 Cal.App.5th 200 (2025), the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District held that an employer’s response, or lack thereof, to an employee complaint of offsite harassment is sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment, even when that off-site harassment by a nonsupervisory employee was not work-related and not imputable to the employer. Human Resources’ mocking and management’s refusal to act were enough to create a cognizable hostile work environment claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”).

The Alleged Harassment Occurred Offsite and Off-Duty

The plaintiff worked as an assistant corporate compliance officer for Bakersfield Recovery Services (“BRS”), which provides substance abuse treatment to recovering alcoholics and drug addicts. Plaintiff’s responsibilities required him to oversee client services, train staff, and to oversee the construction of a new facility being designed for clients.

Plaintiff was responsible for training and overseeing the alleged harasser, Sanders, at a new BRS facility. In 2023, while Plaintiff was on a leave of absence, Sanders sent Plaintiff multiple unsolicited nude pictures and stated that she wanted to have sex with him. Sanders also went to Plaintiff’s home uninvited and indicated she was there to have sex with him. Sanders eventually departed, but left a cucumber with a condom attached on his driveway. Sanders also texted Plaintiff and invited him to a hotel room to have sex and offered him drugs. In all these occasions, Plaintiff firmly rejected her advances and told her to leave him alone and stop harassing him.

Immediately upon returning from leave, Plaintiff complained to the program director, who told him that there was not much she could do about Sanders’ behavior. He also complained to a human resources representative, who later posted a video on social media depicting whining dogs and stated, “This is a work day at the office … lmbo [laughing my butt off].”  There was nothing suggesting that this post was referring to Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff merely felt that it was directed at him. The program manager and human resources representative did not take any steps to separate Plaintiff from Sanders to prevent future harassment, nor take any disciplinary action as to Sanders. Plaintiff went to great lengths to try to avoid contact with Sanders after, but feared he would see her at the worksite. Plaintiff resigned just one week after his complaint, claiming extreme distress, anger, and humiliation, as BRS did not do anything to condemn Sanders’ conduct.

Totality of Circumstances Test In Deciding Whether Harassing Conduct Is Imputable to The Employer

As a matter of first impression, the Court noted that it found no cases arising under the FEHA which explored whether the harassing conduct of a nonsupervisory coworker occurring away from the workplace is imputable to the employer. As a result, it turned to analogous federal authority under the Title VII context for instruction. Like FEHA, under Title VII, for conduct to be imputable to the employer, it must bear a sufficient nexus to the workplace. The Court analyzed various federal court cases finding liability for offsite conduct, including where the employer airline company paid for a block of hotel rooms for the flight crew where the rape eventually occurred during off-duty hours, and another where the plaintiff and her coworker attended training and then drank at a bar at the employer’s training facility, and was later raped offsite after a coworker offered her a ride back to her hotel, since the bar was part of the training facility and the event could be said to have grown out of the workplace environment.  Together, these cases provide persuasive guidance that the work-related nature of conduct is examined under the totality of circumstances.

From the federal authorities, the Court gleaned a number of nondispositive factors relevant to the assessment: (1) whether the harassing conduct occurred in or through a venue or modality that was paid for or hosted by the employer, (2) from circumstances the employer arranged, sanctioned, or approved, (3) in a context where the employer could be expected to obtain some benefit, or (4) in the context of employment-related social circumstances where it would be expected the employees would interact and socialize. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that in the Title VII context, the relevant question is not whether the harassing conduct occurred on or off the physical or digital worksite, but whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the “harassing conduct had an unreasonable effect on the working environment and, if so, to consider whether and how the employer responded to that effect.”  Okonowsky v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2024).

Here, the Court analyzed these nondispositive factors and found the harassment could not be imputed to BRS because the allegations concerning Sanders’ conduct did not occur from a workplace modality that BRS provided or sanctioned explicitly or implicitly – i.e., a cell phone or email provided by the employer, and Sanders’ unwanted sexual advances did not occur in the context of a work-related event or derive from work-related social circumstances where employees would foreseeably interact. The mere fact that Sanders and Plaintiff knew each other only through work did not make Sanders’ conduct work related. Finally, the Court was unpersuaded by the argument that Plaintiff’s complaint to his supervisors retroactively rendered Sanders’ conduct work-related. If that were the case, anything an employee did outside of work would be work related so long as a coworker subsequently reported it.

The Employer’s Failure To Act And HR’s Conduct Could Support A Hostile Work Environment Claim

Again looking to guidance from federal cases analyzing Title VII, the Court found that in the context of FEHA cases, an employer’s response to harassment occurring outside the physical or digital work environment can independently create a hostile work environment.  In Fuller v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 865 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017), the plaintiff was raped outside the workplace by her coworker, and the Court held the plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to the existence of a hostile work environment by alleging the employer’s reactions to the rapes – effectively punishing plaintiff for taking time off, while both vocally and financially supporting her rapist – and that this could have altered her work environment.

Relying on Fuller, the Court found that Plaintiff’s allegations that human resources’ comment and social media post mocking him, in conjunction with BRS’ ratification of Sanders’ conduct through inaction, through his supervisor’s comment that the company would not take any action in response to the complaint because it occurred offsite, materially altered his working conditions.

The Court acknowledged that while Sanders’ conduct did not amount to sexual assault like the rape alleged in Fuller, the totality of the circumstances alleged was sufficient to have altered the Plaintiff’s working environment in an objectively severe manner, thereby stating a hostile work environment claim that should survive a demurrer. The totality of the circumstances included Plaintiff’s supervisor’s statement that there was not much that could be done, the lack of investigation and admonition to Sanders, the alleged mocking and sarcastic comments by human resources, and the failure to take any steps to shield Plaintiff from having to interact with Sanders. The Court concluded that a reasonable person could understand from BRS’ response that it viewed what Sanders had done as not serious; that Plaintiff, as a man, should not be affected by sexual advances from a woman; and that Plaintiff’s well-being in the workplace was of no import to BRS. 

Employers should not dismiss complaints simply because the conduct occurred offsite and off-duty. Responses to such complaints should always be considered on a case-by-case basis and should consider all of the circumstances.

Episode 02: Inside Cultural Assessments – Tools for Navigating Today’s Polarized Workplace

Hosted by Sam Schwartz-Fenwick with special guest Dave Baffa

In this episode of the Cultural Flashpoints Vidcast, host Sam Schwartz‑Fenwick sits down with Seyfarth partner and workplace culture subject‑matter expert Dave Baffa for a candid discussion on cultural assessments: what they are, why they matter, and how their use has evolved alongside shifting workplace dynamics.

Together, Sam and Dave break down the methods organizations use to understand their cultural health, from interviews and focus groups to policy evaluations that reveal how communication, leadership, and day‑to‑day interactions truly function in practice. They also share insights on how cultural assessments can help reduce tension, foster psychological safety, and build stronger organizational trust – all while offering practical guidance for managing risk, setting expectations, and ensuring assessments lead to meaningful action.

By: Romtin Parvaresh and Daniel Whang

There is truth to the proverb that “a closed mouth catches no flies.” In Randolph v. Trustees of the California State University, 3rd App. Dist. C102901 (Jan. 15, 2026), the defendants sat silent when the trial court set a trial date after the five-year statutory deadline to bring a case to trial. Once the deadline passed, they successfully moved to dismiss. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that a non-objection to an untimely trial date does not constitute an express agreement to extend the deadline.

Facts and Procedural History

Randolph was an employment lawsuit filed in 2019. At a March 2024 conference, the trial court set a trial date of February 2025. However, the statutory deadline for trial was October 2024. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.310 (“An action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.”).

After October 2024 passed, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to timely bring the case to trial. Dismissal is mandatory unless a statutory exception applies. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.360. One such exception is an “oral agreement made in open court.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.360(b).

Citing this exception, the plaintiff argued that the parties “verbally stipulated” to the February 2025 trial date at the March 2024 conference. The plaintiff relied on a minute order from the conference that notes the appearances of counsel and the case dates that were set. It contained no further information.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. It found that the scarce information in the minute order did not show that the defendants orally agreed to a trial date beyond the statutory deadline. It also criticized the plaintiff for not objecting to an untimely trial date.

The California Court of Appeal Holds That Mere Silence Does Not Amount to an “Oral Stipulation” to Extend the Statutory Deadline

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal. It held that courts may not infer that a defendant expressly agrees to a trial date merely because “a minute order is silent as to any discussion relating to the trial date.” (Emphasis in original.)

The sole question for appeal was whether the plaintiff established the “oral stipulation” exception to preclude mandatory dismissal. Under that exception, the parties may extend the statutory deadline to bring a case to trial by “oral agreement made in open court, if entered in the minutes of the court or a transcript is made.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 583.360(b).

As the Court of Appeal held, this exception was not met. Because there was no transcript from the March 2024 conference when the trial date was set, the only alternative source for the exception would be a minute order. However, the minute order did not indicate an “agreement” to a trial date beyond the statutory deadline. Instead, it merely shows that counsel appeared and the dates that were set.

The Court of Appeal distinguished Randolph from Nunn v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 64 Cal. App. 5th 346 (2021), which applied the oral exception to extend the statutory deadline. Nunn involved a settled statement that contained detailed facts from a trial setting conference. As reflected in the settled statement, the trial court suggested a trial date within the five-year deadline, but the defendants said the proposed date was “too early” because they needed to depose the plaintiff and then file a dispositive motion. When the trial court proposed an alternative trial date after the deadline, both parties “had no objection.” The Court of Appeal held that an “oral agreement” was made, because the exchange between the trial court and the parties expressed “mutual consent” to extend the deadline to bring the case to trial, specifically to accommodate the defendants.

By contrast, the minute order in Randolph was starkly different. It contained no detail regarding conversations about the trial date and accordingly could not show any “mutual assent” to extend the statutory deadline to bring the case to trial. The Court rejected the argument that the defendants’ non-objection to a trial date after the statutory deadline is sufficient to create an oral stipulation to extend the deadline. The Court reaffirmed that the exception requires that the oral stipulation be shown in a minute order or in a transcript, neither of which was present. 

Impact of Randolph

Randolph shows that it is the obligation of plaintiffs – not defendants – to object to a trial date that falls beyond the statutory deadline to bring a case to trial. If a defendant sits silent when a date is set, that silence does not prevent them from later seeking to dismiss for failure to timely try the case.

By: Adam R. Young, Jennifer L. Mora, and Frederick T. Smith

Seyfarth Synopsis: President Trump’s December 2025 Executive Order signals a possible shift in federal marijuana policy, but many employers still have a lawful and legitimate basis to prohibit impairment at work. Employers that test for marijuana should continue to monitor legal developments and evolving legal risk. Moreover, because employees may not fully understand the implications of the Executive Order, employers should remind employees of their policy expectations.

Since 1970, marijuana has been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, defined as having no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse. Over the years, presidents have floated the idea of reclassifying marijuana, but not taken steps to do so. In 2023, the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) determined that marijuana has a currently accepted medical use, and DHHS recommended to the Drug Enforcement Agency that marijuana be classified as a Schedule III drug.   In May 2024 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) published a formal proposal to reschedule marijuana from a Schedule I to a Schedule III drug. Schedule III drugs are defined as drugs with a moderate to low potential for physical and psychological dependence. Schedule III drugs are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement Agency, and they include acetaminophen (Tylenol) with codeine, ketamine, anabolic steroids, and testosterone. The slow rescheduling process is currently in process and awaiting an administrative law hearing.

On December 18, 2025, President Trump signed an Executive Order, “Increasing Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research.” In it, he directed the DOJ to expedite the process of rescheduling marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III. While this EO perhaps signals an intent to expedite and take political credit for the rulemaking process, rescheduling timeline remains uncertain..

This rescheduling marks a significant policy change and the practical implications for employers—particularly those with safety-sensitive workforces—remain complex. However, the proposed rescheduling of marijuana will not result in the  legalization of  recreational use.

The EO also tasked White House staff and Congress with “updat[ing] the statutory definition of final hemp-derived cannabinoid products to allow Americans to benefit from access to appropriate full-spectrum CBD products while preserving the Congress’s intent to restrict the sale of products that pose serious health risks.” Moreover, the EO tasked certain agencies with developing guidelines for hemp-derived cannabinoids, including specific limits on THC milligrams per serving and container, as well as required CBD-to-THC ratios.

Workplace Implications

Many states and several localities have laws regulating drug policies and drug testing and providing protections to recreational and medicinal marijuana users. Accordingly, employers must be cognizant of the specific landscape for their work forces. Even after rescheduling, employers will still be able to prohibit marijuana use and impairment in the workplace. Employers with drug testing programs who test for marijuana (THC metabolites) will not be prohibited from doing so by the rescheduling (but must remain mindful of restrictions and other limitations per applicable state and local law) .

For many employers, the risks of impairment remain unchanged. The National Safety Council has long endorsed a zero-tolerance policy, emphasizing that no level of cannabis use is safe for employees, especially those working in roles where safety is paramount. That said, because no drug test can prove time of impairment, employers in states with overly restrictive marijuana testing laws will continue to grapple with balancing the risk of an employment claim against the risk of a workplace injuries due to drug use.

Legal Risks and ADA Considerations

Rescheduling may open the door to new challenges by applicants and employee s under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Historically, courts have consistently rejected ADA accommodation claims tied to individuals’ medical marijuana use because marijuana is an illegal drug under federal law. Once marijuana is classified as a Schedule III drug, employees may argue for ADA protections, creating potential litigation risk for employers. To date, most failure to accommodate marijuana claims have been brought under state disability discrimination statutes and other laws, so it remains to be seen whether reclassifying marijuana will lead to a significant increase in such claims.

Practical Steps for Employers

To prepare for this evolving regulatory and legal environment, employers should consider the following:

  • Review and update drug testing policies to ensure they address marijuana impairment if appropriate.
  • Reconsider policies for safety-sensitive positions, consistent with industry recommendations.
  • Train supervisors and human resources staff on recognizing and responding to impairment and handling accommodation requests.
  • Consult legal counsel regarding ADA risks and potential state-law claims tied to medical marijuana use.
  • Communicate clearly with employees about company expectations and the continued prohibition of use and impairment at work.
  • Monitor DOJ rulemaking and state-level developments to stay ahead of compliance requirements.
  • Educate employees to ensure they understand the implications of the EO.

For additional questions on this topic or any other workplace safety inquiry, please contact your Seyfarth attorney.

Episode 01: Navigating Faith-Based Employee Resource Groups in Today’s Workplace

Hosted by Dawn Solowey with special guest Annette Tyman

In this premiere episode of the Cultural Flashpoints Vidcast, host Dawn Solowey sits down with Annette Tyman, chair of the People Analytics Practice Group, to explore one of the most dynamic trends shaping workplace culture: faith-based employee resource groups (ERGs). From their origins in fostering inclusion to their evolving role in supporting diverse identities, ERGs have become a cornerstone of engagement and belonging. This conversation dives deep into the growing interest in faith-based ERGs and why they matter now more than ever.

Employers tuning in will gain practical insights on balancing inclusion with legal compliance, setting clear guardrails, and creating frameworks that work for their unique organizations. With cultural and legal landscapes shifting rapidly, this episode offers actionable guidance for leaders who want to foster community while mitigating risk. Whether you’re considering ERGs for the first time or reevaluating existing policies, this discussion is essential listening for anyone committed to building a respectful, inclusive workplace.

By: Olivia S. Williams, Grayson Moronta, and Christina Meddin

Seyfarth Synopsis

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision Ismael v. Roundtree, No. 25-10604 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025) reversed the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and held “the District Court improperly conflated the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the ‘convincing mosaic’ standard.” In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that summary judgment turns on the ultimate question of discriminatory or retaliatory intent – not whether a plaintiff can successfully dismantle an employer’s explanation. The Court provided guidance for evaluating employment discrimination and retaliation claims at the summary judgment stage, and specifically instructed district courts to consider whether a plaintiff has provided sufficient circumstantial evidence that creates a convincing mosaic of discrimination or retaliation when a plaintiff cannot establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case and when a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale is pretextual.

Factual and Procedural Background

This case stems from Ahmed Ismael’s (“Ismael”) employment with the Richmond County Sherriff’s Office (“RCSO”) as a deputy sheriff. Ismael, who is of Iraqi Arabic descent, alleged RCSO terminated his employment in retaliation for filing a harassment complaint. Ismael’s harassment complaint included allegations that a lieutenant, who was assigned to the same detail as Ismael and was the Commander of the RCSO SWAT Team Ismael hoped to join, continuously made racist remarks including calling Ismael a “terrorist,” telling him to “go play in the sand,” and warning their colleagues Ismael “may have a bomb.” Eight days after Ismael filed his harassment complaint, his employment was terminated for violating the RCSO’s “Manner of Conduct” policy when he allegedly: (i) visited Burke County in his patrol car to inquire about employment opportunities while still on Richmond County time; and (ii) visited Burke County in his patrol car to interview for a position.

In his lawsuit, Ismael made claims of retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under the law in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. After amending his original complaint twice, Ismael retained only his § 1981 claim. Defendants moved for summary judgment and, in response, Ismael presented circumstantial evidence in support of his claim. The District Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on its finding that although Ismael established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Defendants properly articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Ismael’s termination and Ismael “‘failed to prove’ that the defendants’ articulated reason was a pretext for retaliation.”

The Court’s Untangling of  the McDonnell Douglas Pretext Analysis and the Convincing Mosaic Standard

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit expounds its view of the relationship between the McDonnell Douglas framework and the convincing mosaic standard, referring to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Co v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973) as “famous yet ill-understood.” The three-part evidentiary burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas includes the following steps: (i) the employee must demonstrate a prima facie case[1]; (ii) the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action; and (iii) if the employer provides a legitimate reason, the employee has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale is pretextual.

But as the Eleventh Circuit emphasized, McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary aid – not a substantive rule – and its failure does not end the summary judgment inquiry. Rather, as the Court held in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), (1) “a ‘plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent’ and (2)  that a ‘triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” The Court’s holding in Smith is often referred to as the “convincing mosaic standard.” Despite confusion regarding the creation and application of the convincing mosaic standard, the Court over time has made it clear that this standard is “a stand-in” or “rearticulation of the summary judgment standard” that should be applied to employment discrimination and retaliation claims. Thus, a plaintiff who cannot establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is nonetheless still entitled to a full review under the convincing mosaic standard.

Here, the District Court found Ismael met his prima facie burden and therefore proceeded to evaluate steps two and three of the McDonnell Douglas framework. After finding Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext at step three, the Eleventh Circuit explained that the District Court improperly declined to analyze the evidence Ismael presented under the convincing mosaic standard. In doing so, the District Court had reasoned that a separate analysis would be redundant because “‘the terms pretext, convincing mosaic, and summary judgment are substantively the same thing’ and . . . ‘the pretext prong . . . is the same as the ordinary summary judgment standard.’” The Eleventh Circuit not only rejected the District Court’s reasoning, but clarified that in order to establish pretext, a plaintiff must show the employer’s proffered reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment action. Notably, the latter requirement is focused on the same inquiry as the convincing mosaic standard whereas the former requirement is not. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held it would be erroneous for a court to require a plaintiff to negate a defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to defeat a motion for summary judgment because: (i) this is not required to succeed at trial; and (ii) it takes away from the plaintiff’s affirmative case that the driving cause for the adverse employment action was illegal discrimination or retaliation.

Ultimately, because the District Court analyzed Ismael’s retaliation claim only through the McDonnell Douglas pretext lens, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instruction to the District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard which requires the District Court to ask whether Ismael’s circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered together and viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of retaliation and find in Ismael’s favor.

Looking Ahead: The Eleventh Circuit’s Roadmap for Review of Summary Judgment Motions

In an effort to stop courts from “find[ing] new ways to incorrectly apply the framework as a substantive doctrine”, the Eleventh Circuit provided a roadmap based on whether a plaintiff can or cannot demonstrate a prima facie case.

Under the Eleventh Circuit’s roadmap, if a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, they are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent. If the defendant is able to present evidence that successfully rebuts the presumption, the court must ask whether the evidence presented by the plaintiff presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination or retaliation by the decisionmaker. Indeed, a showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would be relevant to the court’s inquiry. However, a plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defendant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.

On the other hand, if a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, they do not automatically lose summary judgment by default. “[T]he consequence is that the plaintiff must produce enough evidence, on their own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or presumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable fact.” Simply put, the court should immediately engage in the convincing mosaic inquiry.

Key Takeaways for Employers

Although the plaintiffs’ bar may characterize Ismael as a significant expansion of employee protections, the Eleventh Circuit did not establish a new framework or a new standard for evaluating summary judgment motions in employment discrimination and/or retaliation cases. Rather, the Court provided clarity and practical guidance regarding the coexistence and application of the longstanding McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the convincing mosaic inquiry.

As has always been the “rule,” employers cannot rely solely on the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to prevail on a motion for summary judgment. Because the Eleventh Circuit has reiterated to district courts that they must consider the entire convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence (even when pretext cannot be conclusively negated), employers should continue ensuring any adverse employment actions are well documented and that employees are treated consistently with respect to company policies. The Ismael opinion highlights that inconsistent documentation, or the misapplication of company policies (even among those employees not traditionally considered “comparators”), could contribute to the “mosaic” that supports a plaintiff’s discrimination and/or retaliation claim. In particular with respect to retaliation claims, the decision also is a strong reminder of the importance of separating decision-makers from employee complaints and the investigation process. And finally, training supervisors on appropriate workplace behavior remains crucial.

Contact a member of the Seyfarth team to learn more about how employers can better navigate employment discrimination and retaliation laws, reduce litigation risk, and foster a compliant workplace environment.

  • [1] To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must show that: (i) they engaged in a protected activity; (ii) that they suffered a material adverse employment action; and (iii) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.”

By: Alison Silveira and Natalie Costero

Seyfarth Synopsis: The University of Georgia Athletic Association (“UGAA”) recently filed an application in Georgia state court to compel arbitration against former Georgia defensive end Damon Wilson II. UGAA seeks $390,000 in liquidated damages after Wilson ended his NIL agreement early and transferred to Missouri. This case offers one of the first public looks at how NIL contracts, the transfer portal, and revenue-sharing rules intersect. 

Background 

Wilson signed an NIL agreement with Classic City Collective in December 2024, worth $420,000 over 14 months, plus bonuses. The agreement also included a liquidated damages clause requiring Wilson to pay Classic City all remaining licensing fees that would otherwise have been payable to Wilson under the agreement if he withdrew from the team or entered the transfer portal. 

One month later, Wilson announced his transfer to Missouri. Previously, NCAA transfer rules required university approval and affected eligibility for future seasons. The 2024 updates removed these restrictions, provided athletes meet GPA and credit-hour requirements. As a result, Wilson has started all 11 games for Missouri this season, and become one of the top pass-rushers in the SEC.  

Classic City terminated the agreement and demanded payment of liquidated damages, consistent with the terms of the contract. It also assigned its rights under the agreement to UGAA, a private, non-profit corporation that manages athletics for the University of Georgia. While still part of the University system (the UGA President and Provost serve as Chair and Vice Chair of the Board, respectively), UGAA oversees all aspects of sports and athletics for the university. When Wilson ignored arbitration demands, UGAA filed in court. 

Why This Matters for Universities 

This case highlights critical compliance and operational risks for universities, intertwined with the assignment and enforcement of NIL rights: 

  • Revenue-Sharing Compliance: Under House, universities face a $20.5M cap on revenue sharing. NIL deals entered into between collectives and athletes fall outside this cap, providing an avenue by which student athletes may earn more for licensing of their NIL based on their own fair market value. Maintaining separation between collectives and universities is imperative for university compliance with House, as the punishments for exceeding the $20.5M revenue share cap, administered by the College Sports Commission, may include anything from significant fines to bans from postseason play to reductions in future scholarship counts and/or roster limits.  
  • Employment Risk: A contract between a collective and an athlete may contain clauses that would be unadvisable in a revenue sharing agreement between a university and its student-athlete.  For example, Wilson’s contract with Classic City was invalidated the minute he decided to stop playing football for UGA. Such a clause in a revenue-sharing agreement, tying eligibility for the funds to continued participation (or, potentially, specific performance metrics) could be challenged as impermissible “pay for play.” Revenue sharing agreements between universities and student-athletes are also already under scrutiny as potential evidence of an employment relationship, which remains a viable and pending legal issue in Johnson v. NCAA. Contracts between collectives and athletes do not face the same scrutiny, lessening concern over terms that could be interpreted as indicia of control, like the prohibition at issue in Wilson against entering the transfer portal.  
  • Roster Stability: The liquidated damages clause in Wilson’s agreement was, presumably, Classic City’s attempt to strengthen the ties between NIL sponsorships and the athletes, with the hope of leading to roster stability. Through these types of provisions, collectives are trying to avoid exorbitant payments for short term commitments followed by rapid exits, while also balancing athlete free agency and the potential for antitrust claims. While the liquidated damages provision did not restrict Wilson from transferring, it functioned like a clawback provision used in corporate compensation packages: a mechanism designed to protect the Classic City’s investment and introduce stability into a system where athletes can move freely with a single transfer portal entry. Universities, who must comply with the NCAA’s transfer portal rules, should closely consider whether similar clauses may be enforceable. 
  • Title IX Exposure: Consolidating NIL funding under the university could trigger Title IX obligations.  Because collectives are privately run corporations, they are not subject to the same Title IX obligations facing universities. Assignment of rights under a collective agreement to a university – where an estimated 80-90% of beneficiaries of collective agreements are male athletes – could raise questions of fund allocation and potential exposure for university beneficiaries.   

Checklist: Before Accepting Assignment of NIL Rights 

If UGAA prevails against Wilson (which the public may never know, as UGAA is requesting that the case proceed to private arbitration consistent with the contract), UGAA could recover significant funds which, presumably, it will use to fund future revenue sharing deals with its athletes.  However, before accepting assignments, universities should consider whether that potential receipt of funds could create inadvertent risk, including: 

  • Does this assignment risk exceeding the House revenue-sharing cap? 
  • Could the agreement resemble “pay-for-play” or employment? 
  • Are liquidated damages enforceable under state law? 
  • Does this create Title IX compliance obligations? 

Looking Ahead 

  • Donor Relations: NIL instability is increasingly frustrating both donors and coaches.  Miami’s Mario Cristobal, for example, has stressed that he is not looking for “one-year subcontractors”—he wants players who care about the University of Miami and invest in the long-term culture of the program. Individual donors are expressing similar frustration, including Troy Aikman who was quoted in a recent New York Times article saying “I’m done with NIL. I mean, I wanna see UCLA be successful, but I’m done with it.”[1] The current influx of money into college sports by donors sponsoring collectives is likely not sustainable, without some long-term return on investment. Contractual devices like liquidated damages are one vehicle by which donors and collectives are trying to align financial commitments with that kind of stability, without in fact prohibiting athlete mobility. Adequate notice provisions could provide similar protections. What’s clear is that careful – and creative – drafting is imperative.
  • Collective Bargaining: Athletes.org has released the first-ever framework of terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), representing the first serious step toward organizing college players around a labor model. How the NCAA and universities will respond remains uncertain. If collective bargaining – for all sports or just certain sports – were to be the next step in the evolution of college sports, key questions need to be answered around who is at the table and what items the parties are willing to bargain – including what types of compensation may be the subject of bargaining. As both institutions and athletes formalize their positions on these subjects, details like assignability of NIL deals with collectives, arbitration of claims, notice provisions, and liquidated damages take on increased significance, along with questions around revenue sharing and – potentially – the future of the transfer portal. Each dispute becomes a preview of what the next era of contracting in college sports will look like. 

Bottom line: With the College Football Playoffs approaching and the transfer portal reopening January 2, 2026, expect more cases like Wilson as universities and collectives navigate athlete compensation and investment protection. Careful drafting and thoughtful planning to navigate potential exposure risks are essential.  

[1] Deitsch, Richard, “Aikman’s guiding principle for ‘Monday Night Football’:  ‘I try to be fair,”’ The New York Times, Dec. 9, 2025.

As artificial intelligence becomes a staple in workplace technology, employers face new challenges around meeting recordings and transcriptions. From automated assistants to AI-generated summaries, these tools promise efficiency, but they also raise complex legal and compliance questions.

In this episode, host Karla Grossenbacher and guest Dave Baffa explore the evolving landscape of using AI transcription in the workplace, focusing on policies for recording and transcribing meetings. They discuss consent requirements, privacy laws, litigation risks, and practical steps employers can take to balance convenience with compliance.

Point Two LE Nation: Workplace Privacy Podcast Series Episode 2 – AI Transcription for Work Meetings And Calls

Read the full transcript here. 

By: Alison Silveira, Lilah Wylde, and Milo Young

Since the House v. NCAA settlement went into effect in July 2025, the federal government has proposed three regulatory responses to concerns surrounding the future of college sports: the SCORE Act, the newly introduced SAFE Act, and President Trump’s “Saving College Sports” Executive Order.  Each seeks to define the future of athlete compensation, protect non-revenue sports, and establish the role of federal oversight. Yet, despite their ambitious aims, none of these measures has made meaningful progress, leaving universities without the clarity and stability they urgently need to navigate this post-House landscape.

Current Status of the House Settlement

Since July, universities across the country have raced to implement the requirements of the House settlement (discussed in more detail here). Those efforts, however, have faced significant obstacles – including legal challenges to roster limits, uncertainty over how revenue sharing complies with Title IX, the looming unresolved question of student-athlete employment status pending in Johnson v. NCAA, and the logistical complexity of managing direct athlete compensation. 

Implementation has been further complicated by the settlement’s mandate that all athlete deals be disclosed to – and approved by – the newly formed College Sports Commission (CSC)(discussed here). The CSC has struggled to keep pace with the sheer volume of submissions. Between June 11, 2025 and August 31, 2025, universities submitted 8,539 deals (valued at approximately $80 million; as of September only 6,090 (valued at $35.42 million) had been approved[1]. Approvals have been reported as taking several weeks or more.  With college football season in full swing, and basketball season approaching, delayed deal approval can mean lost opportunity for both universities and athletes. Several news outlets have reported that some collectives have begun circumventing the approval process entirely, paying athletes before their deals have cleared the system.  

The SCORE Act

In July 2025, anticipating the challenges and unresolved legal issues following House, a bipartisan group of U.S. House Representatives introduced the Student Compensation and Opportunity through Rights and Endorsements (SCORE) Act.  Despite initially passing through committee in the House of Representatives, the SCORE Act is currently stalled. A full House vote has been repeatedly delayed.

The SCORE Act seeks to bring uniformity and legal clarity to the chaotic and rapidly evolving world of college sports. It addresses three major concerns that have plagued the NCAA and its member institutions:

  1. Antitrust Protection: Grants the NCAA and athletic conferences a limited exemption from antitrust suits, shielding them from the wave of lawsuits that have challenged their authority and practices.
  2. Federal Preemption of State Laws: Overrides the patchwork of state NIL (Name, Image, and Likeness) laws, which have created inconsistent rules across the country.
  3. Preserving Amateur Status: Bars college athletes from being classified as employees, thereby excluding them from labor protections and collective bargaining rights.

While the bill has bipartisan support, it has also drawn criticism from both ends of the political spectrum.  Key figures like Rep. Michael Baumgartner (R-Wash.) and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) argue that the bill disproportionately benefits the Power Five conferences and fails to protect smaller schools, Olympic sports, and women’s athletics. Athletes.org, a players association representing thousands of college athletes, has condemned the bill as a “grave step in the wrong direction,”[2] pointing to provisions that:

  • Limit athletes’ ability to monetize their NIL by imposing subjective restrictions;
  • Cap school payments without athlete input;
  • Restrict transfer rights, contrary to recent court rulings; and
  • Prohibit athletes from being classified as employees, denying them labor protections.

In a joint statement, Athletes.org and other players associations warned that the bill entrenches institutional power while silencing athlete voices. They argue that legislation governing college sports should be developed in partnership with athletes—not imposed unilaterally from the top down.[3]

The SAFE Act

On September 29, 2025, while the SCORE Act is currently stalled, Senate Democrats introduced the Student Athlete Fairness and Enforcement (“SAFE”) Act. The bill seeks to stabilize college athletics by prioritizing athlete welfare and protecting nonrevenue sports. Its notable provisions include:

  • Media Rights Consolidation: Amends the Sports Broadcasting Act to allow conferences to pool broadcasting rights, enabling collective media deals that boost revenue and sustain Olympic and nonrevenue sports.
  • Protection for Olympic Sports: Requires schools to maintain scholarship and roster spots for Olympic sports at 2023–24 levels, safeguarding programs often cut during budget shortfalls.
  • Athlete Mobility and Support: Permits athletes to transfer twice without penalty, guarantees scholarships and medical coverage post-eligibility, and allows international athletes to be compensated without jeopardizing their visa status.
  • Agent Regulation: Creates a registry for athlete agents and caps agent fees to reduce exploitation.
  • Revenue Distribution Oversight: Established a new committee to pool and distribute media rights and revenues to schools, enforced by the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general.

SAFE Act vs. SCORE Act: Key Differences

The SAFE Act stands in stark contrast to the SCORE Act in several areas:

  • Athlete Protections: The SAFE Act offers stronger protections for athletes, including post-eligibility benefits and transfer flexibility.  The SCORE Act imposes tighter restrictions on NIL and transfers.
  • Support for Nonrevenue Sports: The SAFE Act explicitly protects Olympic and women’s sports, while critics argue the SCORE Act risks cutting them due to funding constraints.
  • No Antitrust Shield: The SAFE Act does not offer an antitrust shield for the NCAA or conferences, while the SCORE Act does.
  • No Employment Classification Clause: The SAFE Act avoids addressing whether athletes should be considered employees, leaving the door open to future legal and legislative developments. The SCORE Act expressly bars athletes from being classified as employees.

Initial feedback on the SAFE Act reveals support from athlete advocacy groups and smaller schools, while the NCAA and Power Five conferences remain skeptical. The NCAA and major conferences are likely to oppose the bill because it omits their top priorities: antitrust protection and an explicit bar on athlete employee status. Leaders in the SEC and Big Ten have also criticized the proposal to consolidate media rights, warning it could weaken their individual bargaining power and revenue streams.  

The “Saving College Sports” Executive Order

In July 2025, President Trump issued the “Saving College Sports” executive order, calling for a national solution to protect collegiate athletics – especially women’s and non-revenue sports vulnerable to cuts. The order:

  • Requires revenue-sharing models to preserve or expand scholarships and opportunities in women’s and non-revenue sports.
  • Prohibits third-party pay-for-play payments.
  • Sets scholarship and roster requirements for the 2025–26 season, tied to athletic department revenues.

It also established agency deadlines:

  • August 23, 2025: The Secretary of Education, with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), was tasked with developing a regulatory and enforcement plan.
  • September 22, 2025: The Attorney General and FTC were directed to propose litigation strategies and policy guidelines.
  • Ongoing: The Department of Labor (DOL) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were instructed to clarify athlete employment status.

As of the date of this article, no federal guidance has been published.  The DOL and NLRB, in particular, remain silent – the latter unable to act since January 27, 2025 when it lost quorum  and could no longer issue decisions.

Steps In The Right Direction

While the executive order lacks the force of legislation like the SAFE or SCORE Acts, it signals the White House’s policy priorities. Its focus on preserving women’s and non-revenue sports and opposing third-party pay-for-play aligns more closely with the SAFE Act than with the SCORE Act’s institutional protections. If federal agencies follow through with consistent guidance,  universities may gain some near-term clarity on House compliance and the evolving legal landscape governing college sports. 

More broadly, legislative reform efforts in this space are not new, but the SAFE Act has made more progress towards gaining necessary support than other previously proposed legislation, and current publicized response to the SCORE Act suggests that it, too, may receive bipartisan support. If implemented, any of these post-House measures would provide the critical direction to universities and other stakeholders navigating the future of college athlete compensation.

Seyfarth will continue to monitor this space for updates.

[1] Updated NIL Deal Flow Report, dated Sept. 5, 2025, available at https://assets.tina.io/29b83311-e587-42b1-861e-87ebde9aa253/NIL%20Deal%20Flow%20Report%209.5.25.pdf

[2] https://www.athletes.org/news/college-athletes-speak-out-against-the-score-act-unite-as-athletes-org-executive-committee/

[3] https://www.athletes.org/news/the-score-act-is-detrimental-to-all-college-athletes-and-all-college-sports-athletes-org-details-why/

By Christina Meddin and Shannon Cherney

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mullin v. U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs clarifies that confidentiality protections around medical certifications are robust and enforceable, even absent viable accommodation or disability discrimination claims. The Court affirmed that under the Rehabilitation Act, which is analyzed using the same standard as Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Mullin’s discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims could not survive summary judgment. The Court found, however, that when an employer conditions access to protected leave on submission of medical documentation, the medical certification constitutes an “inquiry” triggering confidentiality protection of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Despite dismissing the remaining claims, the Court determined an issue of fact existed as to the employee’s unlawful disclosure of medical information claim.   

In Mullin v. U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a complex set of claims brought by a VA employee alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, unlawful disclosure of medical information, and retaliation (and/or a retaliatory hostile work environment). The case stems from Mullin’s respiratory issues and breast cancer diagnosis, resulting in several requests for workplace accommodations. The District Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of the VA as to all counts. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the disability discrimination, accommodation, and retaliation claims, but, notably, reversed and remanded the District Court’s grant of summary judgment as to the unlawful-disclosure claim, serving as a strong reminder of confidentiality obligations around employer handling of medical information.

The Court’s refusal to overturn summary judgment as to the discrimination and accommodation claims rested on a detailed factual record showing no adverse employment action because of a disability and a reasonable accommodation process that included workstation moves, air purifiers, and incremental telework, culminating in full-time telework. Similarly, the retaliation and hostile work environment claims were rejected as either repackaged accommodation disputes and/or lacking evidence of severity. The Court applied established legal standards under the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporates ADA employment provisions, to dismiss these claims.

In analyzing the unlawful disclosure claim, the Court determined, as a threshold matter, that a private right of action does exist under the ADA for such claim, irrespective of disability status. The Court indicated that the elements of such claim include whether the employer “made a proper inquiry into [the employee’s] medical condition, whether the [employer] disclosed the results of that inquiry to persons in violation of [the law], and whether [the employee] suffered a tangible injury because of the unlawful disclosure.” Mullin v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 22-12354, 2025 WL 2267816, at *9 (11th Cir. Aug. 8, 2025). Contrary to the VA’s argument, the Court held for the first time that an employer’s request for a FMLA medical certification constitutes a statutory “inquiry” under the ADA’s confidentiality provisions, incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act. It follows that medical information obtained through such required certifications is protected, and unauthorized disclosures can give rise to liability. The Court further found an issue of fact as to whether human resources unlawfully disclosed Mullin’s medical information to a union steward, and further, found that Mullin’s testimony with regard to her emotional distress stemming from the disclosure was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the disclosure created harm. In light of these factual disputes about the disclosure of Mullin’s cancer diagnosis and resulting harm, the Court remanded for further proceedings.

Practically, this decision signals to employers that FMLA medical certifications are not mere formalities but can trigger statutory confidentiality obligations under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Moreover, the risk associated with improperly disclosing confidential information is not merely theoretical; employers must carefully limit internal dissemination of such medical information, restrict access to a need-to-know basis, and rigorously document and train HR personnel to avoid liability. Employers should be aware that unauthorized disclosures of medical information—even absent a successful discrimination claim—pose litigation risks. The Mullin decision highlights that emotional distress and other harms from confidentiality breaches can sustain claims.

Contact a member of the Seyfarth team to learn more about how employers can better navigate the ADA, FMLA, and other leave and disability discrimination laws, reduce litigation risk, and foster a compliant, respectful workplace environment.