By: Alison Silveira and Madeline Comer

Seyfarth Synopsis: Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc. reinforces that employment claims must allege facts plausibly connecting alleged discrimination and protected activity to the employer’s termination decision and decision maker. The First Circuit separately emphasized the narrow scope of Massachusetts wrongful-termination claims based on violations of public policy. The case highlights key pleading deficiencies that may provide employers with grounds for early dismissal.
For employers facing discrimination and retaliation claims, motions to dismiss can be an uphill battle. Plaintiffs need not prove a prima facie case at the pleading stage. Courts must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and reasonable inferences ordinarily run in the plaintiff’s favor.
A recent First Circuit decision, however, provides employers with a useful reminder that those principles do not eliminate a plaintiff’s obligation to plead facts making an employment claim plausible, rather than merely possible.
In Grygiel v. HealthEquity, Inc., No. 25-2109 (1st Cir. Nov. 2, 2026), the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Massachusetts General Laws Ch. 151B, as well as a common-law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.[1] The Court emphasized that a plaintiff must plead enough facts to move a claim across the line from possible to plausible. Courts need not credit legal conclusions or speculative allegations.
The decision affords employers with three particularly useful lessons for attacking pleading deficiencies early in employment litigation.
Discriminatory remarks must be meaningfully tied to the decision makers who took the challenged action
The plaintiff, Tracy Grygiel, worked as a Senior Data Architect for HealthEquity, Inc. According to her Complaint, a male project manager called her a “token woman” and “Miss Know-It-All,” and other male coworkers allegedly made similar remarks. Later, during a meeting about a performance improvement plan, the Vice President of Human Resources told her that “the chief complaint is that you’re a know-it-all and will not stay in your lane.”
Those allegations were insufficient to support a plausible inference that HealthEquity, Inc. terminated Grygiel because of her sex. The First Circuit focused on a critical missing link, under both state and federal law: the Complaint did not plausibly connect the discriminatory remarks to the individuals responsible for the termination decision. The project manager who allegedly called Grygiel a “token woman” was not alleged to have had any role in her termination. Nor did the Complaint allege that the decision makers adopted that gendered remark or were influenced by the coworkers who allegedly made discriminatory comments. In other words, nowhere did Grygiel plausibly plead that the Company’s decision to terminate her employment was because of her gender – a connection the Court recognized was critical under both the state and federal anti-discrimination statutes.
The Court was similarly unpersuaded by the allegation that Grygiel’s supervisor was present at a remote meeting when the “token woman” comment was made and did not reprimand the speaker. His mere presence in that meeting, however, again did not make it plausible that he made the decision to fire her because of her sex almost a year later.
The alleged “echo” of the “Miss Know-It-All” remark did not fill that gap. As both the District Court and First Circuit observed, the HR executive’s statement that Grygiel was a “know-it-all” who would not “stay in [her] lane” was gender neutral.
The Court returned to the basic causation principles that alleged discriminatory intent must be traceable to the person or persons responsible for the adverse employment decision and that the Complaint must plausibly allege the decision maker made the decision at issue because of the protected characteristic. Stray remarks by coworkers, even discriminatory ones, do not necessarily establish that connection.
Why this matters: Employers moving to dismiss discrimination claims should closely map the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory animus against its allegations concerning the challenged decision. A complaint may contain troubling or expressly discriminatory statements and still fail to state a disparate-treatment claim if it does not plausibly allege that the speaker participated in, influenced, or otherwise affected the decision at issue. Employers should also identify neutral explanations that emerge from the complaint itself.
Retaliation requires knowledge of the protected nature of the employee’s conduct, not merely knowledge of the conduct itself
The First Circuit applied a similar pleading analysis to Grygiel’s retaliation claims.
After receiving her second performance improvement plan (“PIP”), Grygiel forwarded copies of her PIPs, training certifications, and work emails from her company account to her personal email. Her Complaint characterized this conduct as “self-help discovery” undertaken to preserve evidence for a potential discrimination claim. The Company placed Grygiel on administrative leave for sending herself the documents. It subsequently terminated her employment for violating its “Security and People” policy.
The First Circuit did not decide whether this type of “self-help discovery” constitutes protected conduct under Title VII. Rather, it noted that it has not yet resolved that question under federal law and instead assumed, in Plaintiff’s favor, that the conduct was protected. It likewise referenced the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s multifactor approach to self-help discovery under Chapter 151B. Even with that assumption, the retaliation claim failed for a separate reason.
Although HealthEquity, Inc. knew that Grygiel had forwarded the documents to herself, the Complaint did not allege facts showing that the Company knew why she had done so. She did not allege that she told the Company she was preserving evidence for a discrimination claim, or that the contents of the documents otherwise put the Company on notice that she contemplated such a claim. The allegation that she previously said she was being “set up for failure” was also insufficient to put the Company on notice of a potential gender discrimination complaint, as opposed to generalized dissatisfaction with her supervisor.
That distinction defeated causation. Knowledge that an employee retained Company documents was not equivalent to knowledge that she was purportedly engaging in a protected activity in furtherance of a discrimination claim.
Why this matters: Employers should not read the decision as giving them carte blanche to terminate employees who copy company documents. Rather, what won the day here was more precise: the Complaint did not plausibly allege that the Company knew Grygiel had sent the documents to herself for purposes of pursuing a discrimination claim. When an employee attempts to recast a violation of a confidentiality, security, or document-management policy as protected “self-help discovery,” employers should examine the Complaint for what it actually alleges the employer knew. Temporal proximity between the employer discovering the conduct and taking disciplinary action is not enough if the pleaded facts show only that the employer knew about the conduct, rather than its allegedly protected purpose.
Raising generalized legal-compliance concerns does not automatically implicate a well-defined Massachusetts public policy
Finally, the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of Grygiel’s wrongful-termination claim. Grygiel alleged that she conducted a security audit of HealthEquity, Inc.’s database, identified vulnerabilities, and repeatedly raised concerns that the problems could lead to violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) and related requirements. She argued that terminating her for raising those concerns violated Massachusetts public policy.
The First Circuit rejected that theory based on the narrow scope of Massachusetts’ public-policy exception to at-will employment. Under Massachusetts law, the exception typically protects employees terminated for exercising a legally guaranteed right, doing something the law requires, or refusing to do something the law prohibits.
Grygiel did not allege that HIPAA or another law required her to take the actions that allegedly resulted in her termination. Instead, she alleged that she internally raised concerns about practices that she believed could produce compliance problems. The First Circuit declined to extend Massachusetts law to that broader category, reasoning that preventing discharge whenever an employee raises concerns “generally related to legal compliance” would expand the narrow public-policy exception beyond the boundaries recognized by Massachusetts courts.
The Court emphasized that conduct can be appropriate or “socially desirable” without qualifying for the common-law exception. Internal disagreement over company policies or organizational practices does not become protected conduct under the Massachusetts public-policy doctrine simply because those concerns may have some connection to an important federal regulatory scheme.
Why this matters: Massachusetts employers confronting common-law wrongful-termination claims should ensure the plaintiff pleaded the specific, well-defined public policy allegedly implicated and explained how plaintiff’s conduct fits within one of the three narrow categories of activities protected under Massachusetts law. An allegation that an employee raised concerns about compliance with HIPAA, or another federal law, should not by itself end the Rule 12 inquiry. Employers should ask whether the law actually required the employee to act, guaranteed the employee a particular right, or otherwise prohibited the conduct the employee refused to perform.
Takeaways for Employers
For employers, Grygiel underscores the value of scrutinizing not just what a Complaint alleges, but also the connections it fails to allege. Discriminatory comments by coworkers do not necessarily make a termination claim plausible where the Complaint does not connect those coworkers or their alleged bias to the individuals who made the termination decision, or plead that the decision was made because of the individual’s protected characteristic. Likewise, close timing alone does not save a retaliation claim where the Complaint fails to allege that the employer knew the employee’s conduct was undertaken in furtherance of a discrimination claim. Finally, invoking an important federal law such as HIPAA does not, standing alone, transform internal compliance concerns into the type of well-defined public policy necessary to support a wrongful-termination claim.
Employers confronted with complaints containing these types of gaps should consider whether the allegations establish the necessary factual links or instead leave room for an early challenge under Rule 12(b)(6).
[1] The District Court dismissed each claim with leave to amend the Complaint.






