By Sara Eber Fowler and Lynn Kappelman

Seyfarth Synopsis: Oregon’s new employee scheduling law – impacting hourly employees at large retail, food service, and hospitality employers – goes into effect after the end of this week, on July 1. Affected employers must now be aware of the potential consequences in changing employees’ schedules.

Friendly Reminder! At the end of this week, on July 1, Oregon will become the first state with a predictable scheduling law in effect. You may recall that predictable scheduling laws – sometimes referred to as fair or flexible scheduling laws – are laws that impose certain financial penalties on covered employers who make changes to employees’ schedules, and may restrict specific scheduling practices (like scheduling on-call shifts) altogether. While stemming from admirable goals, these laws can have the effect of making employee scheduling – already head-splitting! – an even more complicated, and costly, process. Until Oregon’s legislature passed its scheduling law last summer, other predictable scheduling laws had been limited to cities and municipalities (e.g., San Francisco, Emeryville, Seattle, New York City).

Hopefully, if you are a covered employer (retail, hospitality or food service employers with 500 or more employees) with operations in Oregon, you have already developed a plan for compliance with this new scheduling law. (And if you have not – do not panic! – the law will not be enforced until at least January 2019.) Below are some key takeaways and reminders for complying with Oregon’s employee scheduling law:

  1. The law does not apply to salaried employees. Given the law’s purpose to cure inflexible, unpredictable schedules that plague hourly workers, that makes sense. Sorry exempt workers, no predictability pay for you!
  2. The law requires advance notice of schedules at least 7 days before the first day on the schedule – not 7 days’ before a shift. So, if you schedule two weeks at a time, your work schedule covering July 15-28 needs to be posted no later than July 8. And yes, it means that, subject to some exceptions (see below), any changes made to an employee’s schedule after July 8 will require predictability pay – even if the change is made with far more than 7 days’ notice before the actual shift. Plan carefully, if you can!
  3. Premium pay comes in all shapes and sizes. It is not just about changing work schedules after the 7-day notice period – any alterations to employees’ hours worked within that notice period may require additional compensation. That includes adding and subtracting shifts, sending employees home early, asking employees to stay late, and changing start or end times (with or without a loss of hours). The amount of premium pay depends on the degree of schedule change. The law also requires premium pay for any employee scheduled to work without 10 hours’ rest, regardless of whether an employee receives sufficient notice (except split shifts).
  4. But, keep in mind – not every schedule change comes with financial penalties. There are many ways for employers to avoid financial penalties for schedule changes. A few notable exceptions include:
  • Schedule changes of 30 minutes or less;
  • Employees voluntarily trading shifts;
  • Employees who request a schedule change (in writing);
  • Schedule changes for legitimate disciplinary reasons; and
  • Employees on a company’s Voluntary Standby List, who agree to work a shift with less than the required notice.

5.  Speaking of which – use a Voluntary Standby List! It is hard to think of a reason not to have a Voluntary Standby List (“VSL”) if you are covered by Oregon’s scheduling law. Employees may choose to include their names on a VSL, and if additional shifts become available (e.g., unanticipated employee call-offs or customer needs), employers can ask employees on the VSL to fill-in without being required to pay additional compensation. Keep in mind, however, that employees on the VSL can still decline to work any shifts offered, and can take their names off of the list at any time. The law also has specific requirements about the kind of notice employees must receive about the VSL, if employers elect to use one.

With these tips in mind, hopefully navigating Oregon’s employee scheduling law will be a more “predictable” endeavor.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the author, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Absence Management & Accommodations Team or the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

 

By Jennifer L. Mora

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently settled lawsuits with two employers it claims violated the Americans with Disabilities Act after rejecting a job applicant and terminating an employee based on their prescription drug use.

The opioid crisis is dominating the news. And, employers have reason to be concerned. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, overdoses from the non-medical use of drugs or alcohol while on the job increased from 165 in 2015 to 217 in 2016, a 32-percent increase. That same report showed that overdose fatalities have increased by at least 25 percent annually since 2012. Further, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control recently stated that use of prescription opioids can result in serious issues with addiction and that in 2014, nearly two million Americans either abused or were dependent on prescription opioid pain relievers.

However, employers should tread carefully when addressing any prescription drug use in the workplace. It has long been the case that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state disability discrimination laws provide protections to applicants and employees taking prescription medication, including opioids, and regulate the right of an employer to inquire about such use. Two recent settlements with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) highlight a few common issues facing employers.

The Settlements

In one case, the EEOC brought suit against a pre-school that allegedly terminated an afterschool teacher after he disclosed his prior opioid addiction and his participation in a supervised medication-assisted treatment program. As part of his treatment, he was legally prescribed Suboxone, which is a prescription used to treat adults who are dependent on, or addicted to, opioids. The EEOC claimed the school terminated the teacher 30 minutes into his first work day because of his use of this medication. The EEOC claimed that the failure of the school to conduct an individualized assessment to determine what, if any, impact the drug had on the teacher’s ability to perform his job violated the ADA. As part of the settlement, which required a $5,000 payment to the teacher, the EEOC required the school to, among other things:

  • Amend its written drug use policy to include a clear and specific exclusion to the policy for individuals who use legally-obtained prescription medication in a lawfully-prescribed manner.
  • Create an ADA-compliant procedure for conducting an individualized assessment of an employee who is enrolled in any form of alcohol, drug, or illegal substance rehabilitation program in order to determine whether the employee can safely perform the essential functions of his or her position with or without reasonable accommodation.

In another case, the EEOC alleged the employer withdrew an applicant’s job offer based on a positive drug test result for prescription medication. The EEOC also alleged the employer maintained an unlawful policy requiring all employees to report if they were taking any prescription and nonprescription medication. Both actions, according to the EEOC, violated the ADA. The parties settled for $45,000, with a requirement that the employer adopt company-wide policies to prevent future hiring issues under the ADA and only require employees to report prescription medications if the employer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the medication may be affecting performance.

Takeaways for Employers

These settlements serve as a reminder that employers should avoid making adverse decisions based on misperceptions or a lack of information about the effect of lawful prescription drug use on their employees’ ability to perform their job duties. In general, employees have a protected right to use prescribed controlled substances and come to work unless such use creates an undue risk of harm or presents a safety issue. Moreover, employers should take precautions before implementing blanket drug-testing policies that do not account for the need under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with individuals taking prescription medications and, if necessary, provide reasonable accommodations. Employers also should consider revising any workplace policy that requires employees to disclose their prescription medication use, unless there is reason to believe the medication may impact performance, or otherwise suggests that employees taking such medication will be treated in a certain way without regard to whether their drug use impacts their work.

For more information on this topic, please contact the author, your Seyfarth Attorney, or any member of Seyfarth Shaw’s Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team or the Absence Management and Accommodations Team.

 

By Honore Hishamunda and Alex S. Drummond

Seyfarth Synopsis: Plaintiffs in disability discrimination cases often have sympathetic facts on their side. A recent decision out of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, highlighted that courts are tasked with applying the law in such cases even if doing so leads to a loss for a sympathetic plaintiff.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), among other things, requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to employees qualified to perform the essential functions of their jobs and prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for exercising their rights under the ADA. Additionally, ADA cases often involve sympathetic plaintiffs. However, a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision – Sepulveda-Vargas v. Caribbean Restaurants, LLC – highlighted the importance of applying the law in such cases even where doing so results in a loss for a sympathetic plaintiff.

The plaintiff in the case was an assistant manager for a fast food franchise. One evening while depositing money on behalf of his employer, plaintiff was “attacked at gunpoint, hit over the head, and had his car stolen.” In the aftermath, plaintiff began to suffer from PTSD and depression. He then requested, as a reasonable accommodation, that he be excused from the company’s rotating shift policy (which rotated managers across the franchise’s district map and placed them on two different day shifts, and an evening shift). After initially agreeing to do so, the employer denied the request.

Plaintiff sued claiming a failure to accommodate. Further, the plaintiff alleged that after making his request, he was retaliated against as he was treated poorly by his co-workers. The First Circuit, affirming the District Court, granted employer’s motion for summary judgment on both of plaintiff’s claims. In doing so, the court noted that its decision was “a lesson straight out of the school of hard knocks” and that “[n]o matter how sympathetic the plaintiff or harrowing his plights, the law is the law and sometimes it’s just not on his side.”

The First Circuit held that the employer did not have to provide any accommodation to plaintiff as he was not qualified to perform the essential functions of his job. Specifically, the court found that the ability to work on a rotating shift was one of the essential functions of his job. In doing so, the court noted that (i) both the employer and plaintiff admitted that rotating shifts was an essential function; (ii) the employer’s job applications for assistant managers and advertising for the same highlighted the need to work rotating shifts; and (iii) permitting plaintiff to bypass the requirement would hamper the employer’s ability to flexibly schedule the remaining assistant managers.

The First Circuit also held that the employer did not retaliate against plaintiff for asserting his ADA rights. Specifically, the court found that plaintiff’s allegations – which focused on being scolded by supervisors for bypassing the chain of command, feeling embarrassed by supervisors treatment, and being made to feel as if he was lying about his health conditions – individually and collectively fell short of statutorily prohibited retaliation. In doing so, the court noted that only treatment that could “dissuade[] a reasonable worker form making or supporting a charge of discrimination” or that produces “a significant, not trivial harm” is actionable. Further, the court found that plaintiff’s allegations fell short of this level and instead characterized his allegations as “nothing more than the petty insults and minor annoyances” which are not actionable under the ADA.

This decision highlights that, even in the ADA context, courts must and will apply the law even if doing so results in a loss for otherwise sympathetic plaintiffs.

If you have any questions regarding this area or need assistance evaluating whether to grant or deny long-term or indefinite leave requests, please contact the author, your Seyfarth Attorney, or a member of the Firm’s Absence Management and Accommodations or Workplace Policies and Handbooks Teams.

By Kevin A. Fritz

Seyfarth Synopsis: The U.S. Supreme Court’s decline of a Seventh Circuit appellate decision solidifies that where an employee is medically unable to return to work within a very short time period following a leave of absence, the employer has no additional federal legal obligation to provide additional leave, or hold the employee’s job open.

Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court declined review of a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision establishing a rule that leave of more than a few weeks in duration falls outside an employers’ reasonable accommodation obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case is Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc.

Plaintiff took Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave for multiple herniated discs in his back. He notified his employer that he was scheduled for back surgery the same day his FMLA leave expired, and he requested another three months of medical leave to allow him to return to work. The employer denied this request and discharged his employment. Plaintiff sued, claiming that his employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation by denying him the additional leave.

What is interesting about this case is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed an amicus brief in support of Plaintiff’s claims. The agency argued that any fixed period of post-FMLA leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation the ADA, and that employers have the burden of demonstrating this additional leave poses an undue hardship.

The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, affirming summary judgment for the employer. In its decision, the Court concluded that leave requests beyond FMLA that extend for more than a brief period of time are never required under the ADA. The Court never answered the question of whether the additional leave request constituted an undue hardship because once it found that employees who are unable to perform their duties for extended periods of time are “not qualified” as defined by the ADA, the inquiry stops.

Now, the Supreme Court’s decline to review this holding establishes that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, employers do not have to provide significant additional leave following expiration under the FMLA because doing so would convert the ADA to a medical leave entitlement statute. Which it is not. The Seventh Circuit stands in opposition to four other federal appellate circuits and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which treat leave in the same manner as any other requested medical accommodation. Other appellate courts, including the Fourth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have not litigated this issue up to the appellate level.

As the workforce continues to change its makeup, and individuals continue to take leaves of absences to attend to their personal needs, this area will surely continue to develop.

If you have any questions regarding this area or need assistance evaluating whether to grant or deny long-term or indefinite leave requests, please contact the author, your Seyfarth Attorney, or a member of the Firm’s Absence Management and Accommodations Team.

By Kristina M. Launey and Myra B. Villamor

Seyfarth Synopsis: Plaintiffs who pursued numerous web accessibility actions under Title III of the ADA are now using website accessibility to test the limits of a different area of law – employment law – California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Over the past few years, we have frequently written about the proliferation of demand letters and lawsuits alleging that a business denied a usually blind or vision-impaired individual access to its goods and services because the business’ website was not accessible, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and state laws.

One firm that pursued many web accessibility actions under Title III and California’s Unruh Act (including a success in the Bags N’ Baggage case decided in plaintiff’s favor by a California state court) is now going after employers. In recent demand letters and lawsuits, they are alleging that employment websites are not accessible to blind job seekers, in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), California’s corollary to Title I of the ADA.

While this blog, and Seyfarth’s Disability Access Team, are focused on disability access issues affecting places of public accommodation that provide goods and services to the general public (not employees, though many of our team members are employment specialists as well), this emerging litigation trend is worthy of our discussion here because it is an extension of the tsunami of website accessibility demand letters and lawsuits pursued under Title III, involving the same technological and other issues, as well as the same plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys.  But there is one big difference – the legal standard that applies to employment disability discrimination claims is different from the standard applied to disability discrimination claims brought against public accommodations.

Title III is unique from other anti-discrimination statutes in that it requires (with exceptions) businesses take affirmative, proactive measures to ensure individuals with disabilities are afforded equal access to their goods and services. FEHA prohibits discrimination against individuals in employment.  It requires employers, upon notice that an employee or applicant for employment requires a reasonable accommodation to perform the essential functions of his or her job, or to apply for employment, to engage in the interactive process to devise such a reasonable accommodation.  The employer does not need to provide the employee or applicant’s requested accommodation as long as the accommodation provided is effective.

In the cases filed thus far, such as those by Dominic Martin, Roy Rios, and Abelardo Martinez in Orange County and San Diego Superior Courts in California last week, the plaintiffs argue that they are blind residents of California who want to enter the workforce, attempted to apply using the defendant’s online application, but could not because it was inaccessible to individuals with disabilities. They claim the WAVE tool confirmed the website’s inaccessibility (an automated tool like WAVE, while useful, cannot be relied upon to determine whether a website is accessible or not, let alone useable by an individual with a disability).

In these lawsuits, the plaintiffs claim that they twice asked the defendant to remove the barriers and were ignored.  Plaintiffs also claim that removing the barriers would take only a few hours (which anyone who has worked in the website accessibility space knows is rarely if ever possible).  Plaintiffs allege these requests that defendant remove the barriers were requests for reasonable accommodation, though they were sent by the plaintiff’s attorney and not the actual individual seeking employment; thus possibly perceived as litigation demand letters rather than legitimate requests for reasonable accommodation.  The plaintiffs allege that the companies did not respond and that they have a policy to deny disabled individuals equal employment by refusing to remove the barriers on the website.  Each plaintiff alleges only a single legal claim for violation of FEHA, even expressly noting he is not asserting claims for violation of any federal law or regulation.

Will these claims find any success in the courts under the applicable law?  We will be watching.  In the meantime, businesses that have been focusing efforts on consumer-facing websites to mitigate risk under Title III should be aware of this new trend (if you have not already received such a letter).

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Disability Access Team.

Edited by: Minh N. Vu.

By Kelsey P. Montgomery

Seyfarth Synopsis: Employee committed to taking opioids loses his job and his disability discrimination lawsuit because he refused to consider alternative pain management.

The “interactive process” required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act, is a two-way street between an employee and his or her employer.  Consistent with this mutual obligation, a federal court in Ohio recently dismissed a lawsuit filed by a former employee who refused to consider alternative pain management for his degenerative disc disease and arthritis in his neck and back.

In Sloan v. Repacorp, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00161 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2018), the plaintiff worked as a production manager for Repacorp, which manufactures and prints labels using heavy machinery.  While Sloan’s job required him to spend only a small portion of his time working on heavy machinery, he always worked around this equipment and his working environment was extremely dangerous.  As a safety precaution, Repacorp maintained a policy requiring employees to notify management if they were taking nonprescription or prescription medication.

A year before his termination, Sloan began taking morphine and Vicodin while at work.  Occasionally, he took the morphine in a manner inconsistent with his prescription and he did not have a prescription for Vicodin.  He secured the Vicodin from his mother and a co-worker.  Sloan did not inform his supervisor, or anyone else at Repacorp, that he was taking these medications.  After several months of using these opioids at work, an employee reported to management that Sloan was obtaining Vicodin from his colleague.  He was immediately removed from the manufacturing floor and required to submit to a drug test.

When he tested positive for hydrocodone (an  in Vicodin), Repacorp placed Sloan on leave and referred him to its Employee Assistance Program.  While on leave, Sloan disclosed his morphine prescription.  Fearing a “huge liability,”  Repacorp asked if there were alternative, non-opioid treatments for his pain condition that would not put the company and Sloan at risk.  Although Sloan tried, he was unable to reach his physician to make this inquiry.  He then told the company president, without having consulted his doctor, that he needed to “stay on [his] medication” and that he “wouldn’t stop taking it.”  The company president believed Sloan “chose drugs over his job.”  Because Repacorp did not have any positions that would permit an employee to safely use opioids in the workplace, Repacorp terminated Sloan’s employment following this conversation.

Sloan subsequently filed a lawsuit against Repacorp, alleging disability discrimination under Ohio law and the ADA.  He claimed that Repacorp failed to accommodate his disabilities by refusing to grant his request to use prescription morphine.  Sloan argued that he could have safely performed his job while taking the medication, and that his employer should have conducted a “direct threat” analysis before denying his request.  The Court disagreed, finding that Sloan impeded Repacorp’s ability to investigate the extent of his disability and the breadth of potential accommodations that it might have reasonably afforded to him by refusing to cooperate with the company’s request for additional information.  Without this information, Repacorp could not determine whether Sloan was a qualified individual able to do his job either with or without a reasonable accommodation.  Accordingly, the Court granted Repacorp’s Motion for Summary Judgement and dismissed Sloan’s case.

Employer Take Away

An employer should conduct an individualized assessment to determine whether it can accommodate an employee’s disability.  Had Repacorp simply terminated Sloan for violating its policy against taking medications at work, the Court likely would have decided this case differently.  Thus, it serves as a good reminder for employers to always document their attempts to engage in the interactive process.  If an employee is terminated after refusing to engage with his or her employer, the employer will have a strong defense to any subsequent disability discrimination claim.

For more information on this topic, please contact the authors, your Seyfarth Attorney, or any member of Seyfarth Shaw’s Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team or the Labor & Employment Team.

By Ariel D. Fenster

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that telecommuting can be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA when the employee is able to perform the essential functions of the position remotely and the request is for a finite period. Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, No 17-5483 (6th Cir. 2018).

The Facts

The Plaintiff, an in-house attorney for Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division (MLG&W), requested to work from home for ten weeks while she was on bedrest from pregnancy complications.  MLG&W denied the request.

MLG&W maintained a rather strict policy that attorneys must be in the office from 8:30 am – 5:00 pm.  “However, [it] did not maintain a formal written telecommuting policy at that time, and in practice, employees often telecommuted.”

MLG&W argued that physical presence was an essential function of Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff stood her ground and stated she was able to perform the essential functions of her position remotely.  In fact, Plaintiff knew she could perform the job remotely.  During the dispute over whether Plaintiff could telecommute, she was also working remotely.  Plaintiff also previously worked remotely for two weeks several years prior.

At trial and in favor of Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim, the jury awarded Plaintiff $92,000 in compensatory damages and $18,184.32 in back pay.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed.  In its finding, the Court noted that MLG&W failed to engage in an interactive process as required by the ADA to determine if working remotely was appropriate. The Court further noted that one of MLG&W’s key pieces of evidence, the job description, was significantly outdated and unreliable (20 years old outdated!).

Additional Guidance

Unfortunately for employers, there is no bright line test on the issue.  Just a handful of cases have weighed in on the “telecommute dispute.”  The two most notable cases come out of the Sixth Circuit, Williams v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, and EEOC v. Ford Motor CoThe cases are distinguishable from Mosby-Meachem for two reasons.  First in Williams and Ford, the employees never previously worked remotely.  Second, the requests to work remotely were for unlimited periods.

Just last month, in Morris-Huse v. Geico, the Middle District of Florida granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment holding that telecommuting was not a reasonable accommodation because Plaintiff’s physical presence was an essential function of her position.  The Court, like many other courts, reasoned that telecommute disputes are highly fact specific and require a true inquiry into the essential functions of the employee’s position.

For some additional guidance, the EEOC has issued some limited guidance on the matter.

Five Helpful Tips

While there is no hard and fast rule as to whether telecommuting is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, here are five tips that may avoid putting you in a telecommute dispute:

  1. Evaluate each and every accommodation request on a case by case basis.
  2. Engage in the interactive process with the employee.
  3. Determine if the telecommuting is for a finite period of time.
  4. Think about whether the employee will be able to perform the essential functions of his or her position while telecommuting.
  5. Maintain up-to date job descriptions that accurately reflect the essential functions of each position.

For more information on this topic, please contact the author, your Seyfarth Attorney, or any member of Seyfarth Shaw’s Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team or the Labor & Employment Team.

By John P. Phillips

Seyfarth Synopsis: Complying with the ADA, particularly when an employee has a mental health-related disability, can be challenging. Fortunately, a recent decision out of the Seventh Circuit provides helpful guidance for employers struggling to accommodate employees with mental health issues while at the same time maintaining safe and productive workplaces. The decision makes clear that in the appropriate circumstances, employers can require an employee to undergo a mental health examination as part of a fitness-for-duty test. The decision—and the New Year—also provides a good excuse for employers to evaluate their ADA policies and procedures.

Every year, employers and HR Departments around the country struggle to comply with the requirements of the ADA. At the same time, ADA-related issues continue to become more complicated, and the individualized nature of disability claims mean that even the most accommodating employers can find themselves making tough decisions—and then having to defend those decisions.

On top of this, there has been a steady rise in employees taking prescription drugs or receiving some form of psychiatric or other mental health treatment. In many cases, these employees have no problem performing their jobs, and no issues arise. However, when these employees begin to struggle in their jobs or, even worse, when they engage in problematic and sometimes aggressive behavior toward co-workers, employers must balance ADA compliance with maintaining safe and professional workplaces. This will continue to be difficult, but a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provides some helpful guidance.

Background on the Case

In Painter v. Illinois Department of Transportation, the Seventh Circuit recently considered when an employer can required an employee to undergo a mental health examination. In that case, Painter, the plaintiff, was a problematic employee, who snapped and screamed at co-workers, gave them blank stares, constantly mumbled to herself, repeatedly banged drawers in her office, was confrontational and argumentative, and began keeping a detailed log of interactions with co-workers during working time, often drafting more than one entry per hour. Painter even sent a concerning email to her union representative, in which she referenced “something” being “dead” and which prompted her union representative to contact the police.

Faced with numerous employee concerns and continued difficulties with Painter, her employer, the Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”), asked that she undergo a fitness-for-duty exam. Initially, IDOT referred Painter to an occupational-medicine specialist, who in turn referred her to a psychiatrist because he noted that Painter could be bipolar. Eventually, after several doctor visits, administrative leave, and continued co-worker and supervisor complaints, IDOT asked Painter to undergo two fitness-for-duty exams with a psychiatrist. At first the psychiatrist cleared Painter to return to work, but when the complaints and concerning behavior continued (and after Painter sent the threatening email to her union representative), the psychiatrist found that Painter was unfit for duty because of her “paranoid thinking and the highly disruptive behavior which results from her paranoia.” Painter then brought suit, alleging that IDOT’s requirement that she see a psychiatrist violated the ADA.

The Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning

Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from requiring their workers to undergo medical exams, unless the exams are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Courts across the country have held that the job-related and business necessity test is a difficult burden for employers to meet. Luckily, the Seventh Circuit took a pragmatic view of IDOT’s decision to require psychiatric exams. The Court stated that when the employer “has a reasonable belief based on objective evidence that a medical condition will impair an employee’s ability to perform essential job functions or that the employee will pose a threat due to a medical condition,” the employer may require a medical exam. The Court also noted that preventing employers from endangering their co-workers is a business necessity, and the Court found that “[e]mployers need not retain workers who, because of a disability, might harm someone; such a rule would force an employer to risk a negligence suit to avoid violating the ADA.”

Applying this legal framework to the facts of the case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that, as a matter of law, the psychiatrist examinations were job-related and consistent with business necessity because IDOT reasonably believed that Painter might be a danger to herself and co-workers. Thus, IDOT did not violate the ADA.

Takeaways and Best Practices

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is welcome news for employers, and it injects much needed common sense into the ADA case law. In particular, employers and HR Departments can consider asking employees to see a psychiatrist for a fitness-for-duty exam in the right circumstances. However, employers must still be careful that any medical examination they require an employee to undergo is directly related to a reasonable belief that the employee cannot perform the essential functions of his or her job.

In addition, there are a number of other proactive steps employers can consider to help ensure that disability-related issues are handled appropriately, such as (1) providing ADA and disability training to supervisors and managers, (2) referring all disability claims to HR, (3) implementing a written procedure for dealing with disability claims, (4) going through the interactive process in all instances, (5) ensuring all job descriptions are up-to-date and accurate, (6) documenting everything, and (7) working with a competent physician or medical professional, as appropriate.

ADA and disability-related issues will only continue to proliferate in today’s workplace. Fortunately, at least one court has recognized the practical necessities employers face when complying with the ADA. By knowing the requirements of the ADA and taking proactive steps to ensure compliance, employers can put themselves in the best possible position to handle all disability-related issues appropriately and minimize any legal risk.

 

By David J. Rowland and Megan P. Toth

Seyfarth SynopsisThe Eleventh Circuit is the next to find a long-term leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.

Just a few months after a recent and definitive decision by the Seventh Circuit that multi-month leaves of absence, even those that are definite in term and sought in advance, are not required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Eleventh Circuit has issued a similar opinion. This decision may signal a growing trend that courts are attempting to curb the abuse of long-term leaves of absence under the ADA that has been rampant and debilitating to employers for many years.

In the recent Eleventh Circuit case, Billups v. Emerald Coast Utilities Authority, the plaintiff injured his shoulder at work and took Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave.  He was not able to have corrective surgery during this time, so under the employers medical leave policy, he was granted another three-month medical leave.  However, at the end of this period — a total of six months of leave — the employee was still not medically able to return to work. He told the employer that he had a doctors appoint in a month and would likely be released to work in six weeks, but it was unclear whether he would have any restrictions at that time. Thus, the employer terminated the plaintiff’s employment and he sued, alleging failure by the employer to provide additional leave as an ADA reasonable accommodation.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment. The plaintiff acknowledged that case precedent says that employers are not required to provide indefinite leaves. However, he argued that these prior decisions involved situations where employees suffered from chronic medical conditions that could continue indefinitely. In this case, the plaintiff contended that an unspecified leave was reasonable because there was a projected end date and once concluded, his medical condition would be resolved without the potential need for additional leave.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument finding that even though the plaintiff would eventually recover, his request was essentially an “open-ended request” for leave of a sufficient time to recover, which is not reasonable under the ADA.  The Court also noted that the employer did not violate the ADA because it already provided six months of leave and the plaintiff inarguably could not perform the essential functions of his job at the time of his termination, with or without a reasonable accommodation and therefore he was not a qualified individual.  Thus, the court found that regardless of the nature of his underlying medical condition and his projected but uncertain recovery, the employer was not required to provide continued long-term leave.

It appears that the Seventh Circuit is not the lone-ranger in its attempt to invalidate the EEOC’s historic and strongly advocated position that long-term leaves are required “reasonable accommodations” under the ADA.  If other circuits continue to follow suit, employers may no longer have a legal obligation to provide lengthy post-FMLA leaves of absence, without the need to justify the denial based on specific business needs.  This case also demonstrates the importance of requesting updated medical information from employees nearing the end of FMLA or other medical leave periods.

If an employee cannot medically substantiate that they can return to work close to the expiration of their FMLA leave, employers may have greater legal flexibility in determining whether or not to accommodate the request. While employers should be aware of this apparently growing trend and may choose to adjust their leave and accommodation approaches accordingly, they still must approach long-term and indefinite leave requests very carefully as there are conflicting decisions from other circuits and the EEOC’s position will remain unchanged unless the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately sides with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.

If you have any questions regarding this area or need assistance evaluating whether to grant or deny long-term or indefinite leave requests, please contact the authors, your Seyfarth Attorney or a member of the Firm’s Absence Management and Accommodations Team.

By David J. Rowland and Cheryl A. Luce

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Seventh Circuit sent shockwaves through the EEOC and through the employer community by concluding that multi-month leaves of absence, even those that are definite in term and sought in advance, are not required by the ADA.

To the surprise of many observers, and undoubtedly the EEOC, the Seventh Circuit held last week in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., — F. 3d — Case No. 14-cv-1141 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2017) that “a long-term leave of absence cannot be a reasonable accommodation” under the ADA. Id. at 7. Judge Sykes, on behalf of a power panel that included Chief Judge Wood and Judge Easterbrook, analyzed the language of the ADA and concluded that it “is an antidiscrimination statute, not a medical-leave entitlement.” Id. at 2.

The facts of the case are straightforward. Severson had a chronic back condition that pre-dated his employment at Heartland that would occasionally flare up and affect his ability to walk, bend, lift, sit stand, move and work.  In June 2013, Severson experienced such a flare-up and took a leave from work.  Over the summer months, he submitted periodic notes from his doctor informing Heartland that he was receiving treatment and could not work.

Heartland approved his request for 12 weeks of FMLA leave. Two weeks before his leave expired, he informed Heartland that his condition had not improved and that he would need surgery the date that his leave expired, and that the typical recovery time for this surgery was at least two months.  Heartland notified Severson the day before his surgery that his employment with Heartland would end when his FMLA leave expired the following day and invited him to reapply with the company when he recovered from surgery and was medically cleared to work. He recovered several months later and, instead of reapplying, filed a lawsuit.  The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Heartland on Severson’s ADA claims and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The EEOC filed an amicus brief and participated in oral argument.  In its opinion, the court took special care to explicitly reject the EEOC’s argument that a long-term medical leave of absence should qualify as a reasonable accommodation when the leave is of a definite, time-limited duration, requested in advance, and likely to enable to perform the essential functions of his job when he returns.  The court found the EEOC’s reading of the statute to equate “reasonable accommodation” with “effective accommodation,” a concept rejected by the Supreme Court in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Severson at 9.  More importantly, the court found that by the EEOC’s logic, the length of the leave did not matter and therefore transformed the ADA into a medical leave statute—“in effect, an open-ended extension of the FMLA”—which the court found “untenable.” Id.

The court left open the possibility that “intermittent time off or a short leave—say, a couple of days, or even a couple of weeks—may, in appropriate circumstances, be analogous to a part-time or modified work schedule.” Id. at 8.  But, relying upon prior precedent from Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003), the court found that the “[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA.” Id.

This decision is the firmest and most comprehensive rebuke of the EEOC’s long-held and vigorously pursued position that long-term leaves are a required form of reasonable accommodation. The Chicago office of the EEOC, in particular, has leveraged multi-million dollar settlements in the past after suing employers that actually had long term, “multi-month” extended leave policies in place, but were unwilling to extend leaves beyond six months or even a year.  This avenue of ADA attack now appears blocked in the Seventh Circuit.

Employers must proceed with great caution in this area for several reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit’s decision arguably conflicts with decisions in the First, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits (at least according to the EEOC’s amicus brief at pp. 15-16 ).  As a result, employers with a national footprint cannot assume this same rule will apply outside of the Seventh Circuit.  Second, Severson could seek rehearing en banc, likely with the EEOC’s support.  Given the panel in Severson, though, a rehearing bid may be an uphill battle.

For more information on this topic, please contact the authors, your Seyfarth Attorney or a member of the Firm’s Absence Management and Accommodations Team.