Seyfarth Synopsis: Mandatory vaccines and flu shots present challenges to employers attempting to accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs of employees. In this case, a hospital worker claimed that he was terminated for failing to get a flu shot due to his religious beliefs. In affirming the District Court’s decision granting the employer’s motion to dismiss, the Third Circuit held that the worker’s anti-vaccination beliefs were not religious and that, as a result, he was not entitled to the protections of Title VII. Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of S. Pa., No. 16-3573 (3rd Cir. Dec. 14, 2017).
The plaintiff, Paul Fallon, was a Psychiatric Crisis Intake Worker. In 2012, Fallon’s employer, defendant Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania, began requiring employees to obtain a yearly flu vaccine, or submit an exemption form to obtain a medical or religious exemption. Any employee granted an exemption was required to wear a mask as an accommodation.
Although Fallon did not belong to any organized religious organization, he held strong personal and medical beliefs opposing the flu vaccine. As alleged in his complaint, Fallon believed that he “should not harm” his own body and that the flu vaccine “may do more harm than good.” In 2012 and 2013, Fallon sought and obtained exemptions based on his personal beliefs, which he explained in a lengthy essay attached to his requests for exemption. In 2014, Fallon again requested an exemption and again attached the essay to his request; however, his request was denied, and his employer explained that its standards for granting exemptions had changed. His employer requested a letter from a clergy member to support his request. Fallon could not provide one. He was suspended and ultimately terminated for failure to comply with the flu vaccine requirements.
Fallon filed a complaint in federal District Court in Pennsylvania wherein he alleged disparate-treatment religious discrimination and failure to accommodate his religion in violation of Title VII. The District Court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss because Fallon’s beliefs, while sincere and strongly held, were not religious in nature and, therefore, were not protected by Title VII. The dismissal was with prejudice because the District Court concluded that an amendment to Fallon’s complaint would be futile. Fallon appealed.
In its opinion affirming the judgment of the District Court, the Third Circuit analyzed whether Fallon’s beliefs were, in fact, religious. Specifically, pursuant to Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent, the Court analyzed:
- Whether Fallon’s beliefs were, in the context of Fallon’s life, religious;
- Whether Fallon’s beliefs occupied a place in Fallon’s life parallel to that filled by God in a traditionally religious person;
- Whether Fallon’s beliefs addressed “fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters”;
- Whether Fallon’s beliefs were a “belief-system”; and
- Whether there were any formal and external signs of Fallon’s beliefs.
After identifying and analyzing these factors, the Court held that Fallon’s beliefs were not religious because they did not “address fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters.” Rather, Fallon “simply worr[ied] about the health effects of the flu vaccine, disbelieve[d] the scientifically accepted view that it is harmless to most people, and wish[ed] to avoid this vaccine.” In sum, the Court held that Fallon’s belief–although sincerely held–was medical, rather than religious, and did not occupy a place in Fallon’s life similar to that of a more traditional religion or faith.
Since Fallon’s objection to the flu vaccine was not religious, it was not protected by Title VII. Importantly, the Court noted that anti-vaccination beliefs can be part of a broader religious faith and that, in those circumstances, they are protected. In fact, in a footnote, the Court pointed out that Christian Scientists regularly qualify for exemptions from mandatory vaccination requirements.
Employer Takeaways Regarding Religious Accommodation Generally
For employers, and especially healthcare employers, this case reiterates the well-established standards for what constitutes a sincerely held religious belief–rather than a secular personal or medical belief — to warrant an accommodation.
Once an employer determines that an employee has a “sincerely held” religious belief, Title VII requires the employer to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious belief, unless the employer can demonstrate that it is unable to reasonably accommodate “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” Importantly, if the employer denies the requested religious accommodation, the employer has the burden to prove the hardship.
The Fallon case also serves to remind employers that what is “religious” is a situational, case-by-case inquiry, especially when considering that one person may engage in a practice for religious reasons, but another person may engage in the very same practice for purely secular, non-religious reasons.
It is good practice for employers, in the interactive process, to ask the employee about the nature of the beliefs, in a sensitive, non-prying manner that respects the employee’s beliefs and privacy. In doing so, the employer may help elicit what is religious versus what is personal preference. Before doing so, employers should seek advice of counsel with expertise in this area because the distinction between religious and non-religious beliefs is tricky and highly fact-specific.
It is, however, not a best practice for an employer to request a letter from a clergy member to support an employee’s claim of a religious belief. It is well-established that an employee’s belief need not be part of an organized, established religion, and it need not be approved by a clergy member. The Court in Fallon, in a footnote, reiterated that “[a] letter from a clergy member is not the only way to demonstrate that one holds a religious belief.” The Court further stated that Fallon’s employer mistakenly believed that it could not discriminate on the basis of religion if it terminated an employee who could not produce a letter from a clergy member. (Nevertheless, the Court held that because Fallon’s beliefs were not religious, terminating him for acting on his beliefs did not constitute religious discrimination.)
The Legal Landscape Regarding Mandatory Vaccines and Religious Accommodation
Employers should be mindful that mandatory flu vaccine policies, particularly for healthcare employers, is a hotly contested issue that can be very jurisdictionally dependent. Healthcare employers are in the unique position of balancing two equally important priorities: employee requests for religious accommodations, and patient health and safety.
Since 2016, the EEOC has brought several lawsuits against hospitals and healthcare providers in connection with mandatory flu vaccine programs.
In the recent case of EEOC v. Baystate Medical Center, Inc., No. 16-30086 (D. Ma.), the EEOC claimed the employer violated Title VII when it suspended and later terminated an employee after she refused to get the flu vaccine. The EEOC claimed the employer violated Title VII when the only accommodation it allegedly offered to the employee who sought a religious exemption to the flu vaccine–wearing a face mask at all times while at work–did not allow the employee to effectively perform her job. Although Baystate Medical Center, Inc. is still pending, both that case and Fallon reiterate the duty of healthcare employers to consider accommodations under Title VII based on the specific facts and circumstances of the situation.
Particularly in light of the EEOC’s recent activity on this issue, an employer must explore what reasonable accommodations can be offered to an employee (preferably with advice of counsel with expertise in this area) and, if the employer is going to deny the request for accommodation, it must document the justifications for the denial.
Employers, their human resources departments and counsel must also be aware of developments in federal, state, and local discrimination laws, which can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.