By Johanna T. Wise and Arielle Eisenberg

Seyfarth Synopsis: On November 18, 2016, the EEOC issued new guidance on its enforcement of anti-discrimination laws related to national origin. The guidance provides clarification on the scope of national origin under Title VII and supersedes the 2002 update to the EEOC Compliance Manual, Volume II, Section 13.

Immigration, and thus the number of employed immigrants, has been steadily rising. In the wake of this increase in national origin diversity within the workplace, the EEOC issued an updated guidance to inform both employers and employees how it interprets, approves, and/or disapproves of court interpretation of national origin discrimination cases.  Tellingly, this is the EEOC’s first update to its national origin guidance since 2002, which reflects the EEOC’s current focus on national origin discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

The guidance clarifies the definition of “national origin,” and what constitutes discrimination based on “place of origin” and “ethnicity” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:

  • National Origin: “discrimination because an individual (or his or her ancestors) is from a certain place or has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a particular national origin group.”
  • Employment Discrimination Based on Place of Origin: “discrimination ‘because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin.’ The place of origin may be a country . . . may be the United States . . . may be a geographic region, including a region that was never a country but nevertheless is closely associated with a particular national origin group.”
  • National Origin Group/Ethnic Group: “a group of people sharing a common language, culture ancestry, race, and/or other social characteristics.” This includes discrimination based on ethnicity and physical, linguistic or cultural traits.

The EEOC has also added Native American, or tribe members, to the definition of national origin. The guidance then provides an analysis of the intersection of national origin discrimination and other protections under Title VII such as race, color and religion.

The guidance further includes a non-inclusive list of all aspects of employment to which Title VII applies, as well as a list of “promising practices” or employment practices which “may help reduce the risk of violations.” Some highlights include:

  • Recruitment: “use a variety of recruitment methods to attract as diverse a pool of job seekers as possible.”
  • Hiring, Promotion and Assignment: establish “written objective criteria for evaluation candidates; communicating the criteria to prospective candidates; and applying those criteria consistently to all candidates.”
  • Discipline, Demotion, and Discharge: develop “objective, job-related criteria for identifying the unsatisfactory performance or conduct that can result in discipline, demotion, or discharge.”
  • Harassment: communicate clearly “to employees through policies and actions that harassment will not be tolerated and that employees who violate the prohibition against harassment will be disciplined.”

Other areas the new guidance covers are national origin as it relates to human trafficking, harassment, language barriers, citizenship, retaliation and foreign employers in the United States.

Lastly, the EEOC has also published a FAQ to be used in conjunction with the guidance and a small business fact sheet.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By

Seyfarth Synopsis: The EEOC recently released its annual Performance and Accountability Report for the fiscal year 2016, a must-read for employers regarding statistical data on EEOC litigation. Continuing a trend from recent years, the EEOC has reaffirmed its commitment to targeting companies in high-profile systemic litigation, albeit with uninspiring results.

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On November 16, 2016, the EEOC released its annual 2016 Performance and Accountability Report (“PAR”) (the Report is here). The PAR highlights the progress of the EEOC’s continued efforts to meet the performance goals that are articulated in its 2012 Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”), including its systemic litigation initiative. As the saying goes, the numbers speak volumes.

The PAR functions as a statistical “scorecard” for the EEOC. It provides a report on its activities during the past fiscal year, from October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016, including its progress toward meeting the goals outlined in the SEP. While the PAR typically provides a preview of what we can expect to see from the EEOC in the upcoming months, this year’s edition notably avoids speculating as to the future of the EEOC under a new President.

The EEOC’s Overall Results

The EEOC reports that it increased the number of charges resolved to 97,443 charges, up 6.5% from the 91,503 last year. In FY 2014 and FY 2015, the EEOC received 88,778 and 89,385 charges respectively, so the number of charges filed is up slightly over past years.

One of the major goals the EEOC identified in its 2012 SEP was to increase its efforts to champion bigger, more media-focused “systemic” cases, including pattern or practice cases where the alleged discrimination “has a broad impact on an industry, occupation, business, or geographic area.” In the SEP, the EEOC set forth a goal to ensure that systemic cases make up at least 20% of its annual litigation docket and at least 22% to 24% of its litigation docket by 2016. (Read more here.)  In FY 2016, the EEOC asserts it “meets or exceeded” five of the seven measures outlined in the SEP, while it “partially met” the other two.

The EEOC noted that it filed 18 systemic lawsuits in FY 2016, which represents a slight increase from 17 in 2014 and 16 in 2015.  Nevertheless, the number of pending systemic cases declined slightly, with 47 cases on its litigation docket (versus 54 in FY 2013, 57 in  FY 2014, and 48 in  FY 2015). Finally, the EEOC reports it recovered approximately $38 million in relief for victims of systemic discrimination (down from $40 million in FY 2015, but up from $13 million in FY 2014).

Charges: Breezin’ Through The Backlog

The EEOC reduced the charge workload by 3.8% to 73,508, a 3,100 charge reduction compared with FY 2015.  As of the end of FY 2015, the EEOC had a backlog of 76,408 charges, which was an increase of 750 charges over the backlog at the conclusion of FY 2014. The EEOC also noted that it responded to over 585,000 calls to its toll-free number and more than 160,000 inquiries to field offices.

The EEOC resolved over 15,800 discrimination charges through the agency’s administrative processes – comprised of settlements, mediations, and conciliations. This included 273 resolutions of systemic investigations, obtaining more than $20.3 million in remedies. The agency’s mediation program achieved a success rate of over 76%. Regarding conciliation, the EEOC notes that its success rate has remained at 44% over the past two fiscal years.

Settlements: Slowing Down

The EEOC secured more than $482.1 million in total relief in FY 2016. For victims of discrimination in private, state and local government, and federal workplaces, the EEOC obtained $347.9 million through mediation, conciliation, and settlements, again a slight decrease from the $356.6 million it collected in FY 2015 (but an increase from the $296.1 million that it collected in FY 2014). Litigation recoveries also decreased, as the EEOC recovered $65.3 million in FY 2015 while recovering only $52.2 million in 2016.

Lawsuits: Less Litigation

The number of lawsuits filed by the EEOC took a sharp decline, dropping from 142 merits lawsuits (including 100 individual suits, and 42 suits involving discriminatory policies or multiple victims) in FY 2015 to only 86 lawsuits in FY 2016 (including 58 individual suits and 29 suits involving multiple victims or discriminatory policies). Further, at the end of the fiscal year, the EEOC had 165 cases on its active docket. At the end of FY 2015, the EEOC had 218 cases on its active district court docket. This data illustrates how the EEOC has refocused its agenda to put its eggs into ever larger baskets.

Systemic Investigations

The number of systemic investigations completed by the EEOC remained the same. In FY 2016, EEOC field offices resolved 273 systemic investigations and obtained over $20.5 million in remedies in those resolutions (with 71 of the FY 2016 resolutions resulting from successful conciliations). In addition, the agency issued reasonable cause determinations finding discrimination in 113 systemic investigations. By comparison, in FY 2015, the agency reported that it completed 268 systemic investigations; issued 109 cause findings; and resolved 70 systemic investigations by voluntary conciliation agreements, obtaining over $33.5 million in remedies as a result of its systemic initiative.

Accordingly, although the EEOC completed roughly the same number of systemic investigations in FY 2015 and FY 2016 and issued a similar number of reasonable cause determinations in those years, FY 2016 collected a substantially lower amount of money as a result of these larger pattern and practice cases.

Implications For Employers

While the numbers confirm our predictions from 2015 (here) and 2014 (here) that the EEOC would continue its pursuit of high-profile systemic litigation, whether that agenda has been a success is an open question. For example, the EEOC’s financial recoveries have not markedly increased. If and how the EEOC adjusts its tactics to adapt to the incoming Trump administration remains to be seen. If that administration moves in a more employer-friendly direction, or restricts the EEOC’s funding, that could cause the EEOC to rethink its priorities and  its approach to its enforcement program.

Readers can also find this post on our EEOC Countdown blog here.

 

By Mary Kay Klimesh, Sam Schwartz-Fenwick, and Abigail Cahak

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Supreme Court is poised to hear and rule on the Obama Administration’s position regarding coverage of gender identity within Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination. However, the status of the case is uncertain in light of who the incoming Trump Administration will appoint to the currently vacant ninth seat vacancy on the Court.

On October 28, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal in the matter of Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., which asks the Court to weigh in on the issue of restroom access for transgender students.  The Supreme Court’s ruling is anticipated to address whether the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) may interpret a federal law prohibiting sex discrimination to cover claims based on gender identity.

The case appeals the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which concluded that a Virginia school board violated Title IX when it decided not to allow a transgender male student to use the boys’ restroom.

The District Court Dismisses the Case

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially dismissed the plaintiff’s case, reasoning that, although Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, it does not include concepts such as gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation in that prohibition. The District Court concluded that Title IX’s regulations allow schools to provide separate restrooms on the basis of sex, that the plaintiff’s biological sex is female, and that requiring him to use the girls’ restroom did not constitute sex discrimination.

The Fourth Circuit Reverses Due to Deference to the DOE’s Interpretation

The Fourth Circuit reversed based on deference to the DOE’s position that the term “sex” as used in Title IX incorporates gender identity.

Since 2014, the DOE and other federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have interpreted and enforced their respective statues and regulations prohibiting sex discrimination to include a ban on gender identity discrimination.

In a January 7, 2015 opinion letter, the DOE stated that “[w]hen a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat transgender students consistent with their gender identity” and cited its prior statements in a December 2014 policy document to similar effect.  More recently, in May 2016, the DOE issued a Dear Colleague letter reiterating its position that, when a school is notified by a parent or guardian that their child will assert a gender identity different from previous representations or records, the school must begin treating the student consistent with that gender identity and that Title IX imposes no medical diagnosis or treatment requirement as a prerequisite.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the DOE’s interpretation of its own Title IX regulations was entitled to Auer deference, which requires that an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.  The court found the DOE’s interpretation permissible because “[a]lthough the regulation may refer unambiguously to males and females, it is silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female.”  Further, “[t]he regulation is silent as to which restroom transgender individuals are to use when a school elects to provide sex-segregated restrooms, and the Department’s interpretation, although perhaps not the intuitive one, is permitted by the varying physical, psychological, and social aspects.”  And although the DOE’s interpretation was “novel,” this alone “does not render the current interpretation inconsistent with prior agency practice,” particularly where the DOE and other federal agencies have consistently enforced the position since 2014.

An Uncertain Future

The school board petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case arguing that the Fourth Circuit erred because the DOE’s interpretation actually alters the meaning of Title IX.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and has granted certiorari on two questions: first, whether Auer deference should extend to an unpublished agency letter and, second, whether, regardless of deference, the DOE’s interpretation of Title IX and its regulations should be given effect.

It is unclear how President-elect Trump will handle the pending case once in control of the DOE and he has not clearly indicated his intentions on the matter.  However, Vice President-elect Pence has stated his position that the issue should be resolved at the local level.  As a practical matter, the new Administration could withdraw the DOE’s policy statements which could render the case-or-controversy requirement moot or which could otherwise prompt the Supreme Court to remand the decision to the lower courts for reconsideration.

Assuming the case proceeds forward, it will be heard during the Supreme Court’s October 2016 Term, which runs through June 2017.  The Supreme Court’s ruling will likely have a broader impact beyond education and could also have application to cases interpreting prohibitions on sex discrimination contained in other federal statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The decision is expected to be sharply divided amongst the justices and, with Justice Scalia’s seat still sitting vacant, it is unknown how the lack of a ninth justice or the appointment of that position may impact the ruling.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By Joshua D. Seidman and Tracy M. Billows

Seyfarth Synopsis: As expected, on November 8, 2016, residents in Washington and Arizona voted on and passed the nation’s sixth and seventh statewide mandatory paid sick leave laws.

The 2016 election will go down as one of the most memorable elections in our lifetime. As the country scrambles to prepare for the seemingly inevitable wave of change that will mark at least the next four years, one understated winner last Tuesday was the nation’s recent mandatory paid sick leave wave.

As highlighted in last week’s post, two statewide mandatory paid sick leave (“PSL”) laws were poised for passage during the November 8 election. And pass they did. Voters in both Washington and Arizona passed separate ballot measures on election night that will extend mandatory PSL obligations to employers across both states. Washington and Arizona are now the sixth and seventh states in the country to pass such a law, following Connecticut, California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont.

The Washington and Arizona laws are currently slated to go into effect on January 1, 2018 and July 1, 2017, respectively. While administrative guidance and state regulations could clarify and adjust employers’ compliance obligations in the coming months, below are some highlights of these two impending laws as of today.

Washington PSL Law

Employers covered by the Washington PSL law must allow employees to accrue one hour of PSL for every 40 hours worked. Employers also must allow 40 hours of earned, unused PSL to carry over at year-end. The approved initiative currently is silent on whether there is any cap on how much PSL employees can ultimately accrue and use in a single year. Employers should keep close watch on whether any such requirements are imposed before January 1, 2018.

Relatedly, the Washington PSL law expressly permits frontloading PSL at the start of a benefit year. However and significantly, frontloading PSL may not get rid of an employer’s year-end carryover obligations. The approved initiative states that frontloading is allowed if it “meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.”

Employees eligible can use Washington PSL for a number of reasons, including (a) their own injury, illness, or health condition, (b) the injury, illness, or health condition of a covered family member, (c) closure of the employee’s place of business or employee’s child’s school or place of care by order of a public official, and (d) certain absences related to domestic violence. Covered family members include, among other relationships, the employee’s children, parents, spouse, registered domestic partner, grandparents, grandchildren, and siblings.

The Washington law also contains a number of other substantive, technical components. These include, among other provisions, (a) employers can mandate that employees provide reasonable notice of a PSL absence, (b) a 90 calendar day usage waiting period for new hires, (c) employers may require employees to verify that PSL was used for an authorized purpose only after an absence exceeding three days, and (d) unused PSL does not need to be cashed out upon separation of employment.

Arizona PSL Law

Unlike the Washington law, the Arizona PSL law determines covered employers’ accrual and usage obligations based on the size of their workforce. Employers with 15 or more employees must allow employees to accrue and use at least 40 hours of PSL per year. The accrual and usage duties drop to 24 hours of PSL per year for smaller employers. The law requires that PSL accrue at least as fast as one hour for every 30 hours worked, regardless of employer size.

The Arizona law notes that earned PSL shall carry over from one year to the next, subject to the above usage cap limitations. However, the law does not clarify whether employers can cap how much unused PSL carries over at year-end. Importantly, Arizona employers can eliminate their year-end carryover obligations if they (a) pay employees for unused PSL at year-end, and (b) provide employees with a lump grant of PSL that is equal to the above amounts (depending on employer size).

Among the protected reasons for using Arizona PSL are (a) employees’ own injury, illness, or health condition, (b) the injury, illness, or health condition of a covered family member, (c) certain public health absences, and (d) certain absences related to domestic violence, sexual violence, abuse, or stalking of the employee or the employee’s covered family member. Covered family members include, among other relationships, any individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship.

Other substantive components of the Arizona PSL law include (a) PSL begins accruing on the later of July 1, 2017 or an employee’s start of employment, (b) there is a 90-day PSL usage waiting period for employees hired after July 1, 2017, (c) PSL must be provided upon employee request, which can be done orally, in writing, electronically, or by other means acceptable to the company, and (d) unused PSL need not be cashed out upon separation of employment.

Employers in Washington and Arizona should continue to monitor developments involving their state’s respective PSL laws, including looking for possible regulations, FAQs, or notices and begin taking steps as soon as possible to ensure that they will be able to achieve full compliance by the July 1, 2017 (Arizona) and January 1, 2018 (Washington) effective dates.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Absence Management & Accommodations Team or the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By Alex Passantino

As the nation waited for the final states to be called in the early morning hours on Wednesday, we here at the Wage & Hour Litigation Blog focused on our one thing: what impact would the result have on the DOL’s overtime exemption regulations scheduled to go into effect on December 1, 2016?  How does the election of a Republican House, a Republican Senate, and President-Elect Donald Trump change what employers should be doing as we speed towards the December 1 deadline?

The short answer is that — at least for the near-term — employers should continue the same way as they have been, with a laser focus on being in compliance by December 1.

That being said, there are a couple of ways that the regulations can be stopped before December 1.   And there are a couple of others that may change the game after December 1.

The first path is through the Eastern District of Texas. As we have reported previously, 21 states and dozens of trade associations filed separate lawsuits (which since have been consolidated) challenging the overtime exemptions rules on a variety of grounds.  A hearing on the states’ motion for injunctive relief is scheduled for next week, on November 16.  The trade associations are being permitted to participate as amici in the states’ case, and also have filed an expedited motion for summary judgment.  It is possible that the judge will enjoin the rules in advance of the December 1 effective date.  As is the case with most litigation, however, that result is less than certain.

A second pre-December 1 path to stopping — or at least delaying — the overtime exemption regulations is through Senator Alexander’s Overtime Reform and Review Act, S. 3464.  That bill would — by statute, not by regulation — increase the salary level to $692 per week on December 1, 2016, then increase it again in 2018, 2019, and 2020 until it hit $913/week.  The bill also contains special provisions protecting nonprofit, state and local government, and education employers from salary increases unless certain conditions are met.  Although the Senate has been expected to take up the bill upon return to Capitol Hill, the short legislative calendar and the threat of a veto by President Obama pose significant hurdles to relief before the December 1 deadline.

Once we get into 2017, there are additional tools at the disposal of Congress and a Trump Administration. With the new salary level taking effect nearly eight weeks before Inauguration Day, however, there will be substantial political calculations involved in any use of those tools.

One tool is the seldom-used Congressional Review Act, a law that allows Congress to review and disapprove new agency regulations within prescribed time periods. Congress could pass a “resolution of disapproval” of the new regulations that would have the effect of rescinding the rules.  Under the CRA, any regulation issued within the final 60 legislative days before Congress adjourns sine die is treated as having been issued on the 15th legislative day of the next session of Congress.  This allows the CRA resolution to be considered by the new Congress and, in this case, the new President, which makes it much more likely that the resolution will be successful.  Because the final 60 legislative days can be counted only in retrospect, the regulations that might be subject to this procedure are unknown.  An early estimate placed the “deadline” at May 16, 2016.  The overtime exemption rules were issued on May 23, 2016, which would place them within the review period.  Whether they actually fall within that period depends on how much Congress is in session over the coming weeks.  Assuming the overtime exemption rules fall within the relevant period, in the next session of Congress, and after January 20, 2017, President Trump could sign the CRA resolution, which would make it as if the rules never existed.

Finally, we could see rulemaking by the Trump Administration, such as a notice-and-comment rulemaking revising the salary level downward and/or eliminating the three-year automatic update provision. Going through the notice-and-comment process would be time-consuming and likely would not result in any relief on the salary level until well into 2017, at best.

Ultimately, employers should continue their efforts to be compliant by December 1. There are far too many variables at this point to conclude otherwise.

By Annette Tyman, Lawrence Z. Lorber, Jaclyn W. Hamlin, and Brent I. Clark

 

Seyfarth Synopsis: The first of several anticipated challenges to Executive Order 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” has resulted in a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of some – but not all – aspects of the Executive Order and its implementing regulations. In a significant victory for the government contracting community, the Associated Builders and Contractors of Southeast Texas won an injunction staying the application of the reporting and disclosure requirements, as well as the prohibition on entering into mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The Judge left the paycheck transparency provisions in effect, however, and as a result, government contractors must still plan for compliance with those requirements.

Introduction

For our readers that are interested in occupational safety and health topics, we are blogging our colleagues “Management Alert” below, with this introductory note. OSHA citations are covered among the labor laws covered by the Executive Order 13673 (Blacklisting Order). The way the Blacklisting Order reads is that the covered violations include citations which are not final, which are being contested by the employer, and which may ultimately be withdrawn through settlement or by a Judge once the employer has had a chance to present its defense.  The Blacklisting Order is another example of the government’s “guilty until proven innocent” approach to regulating businesses and employers.

Note also that the Blacklisting Order will be applicable under:

  • The Fair Labor Standards Act
  • The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (including OSHA-approved State Plans equivalent to State Laws)
  • The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
  • The National Labor Relations Act
  • 40 U.S.C. chapter 31, subchapter IV, also known as the Davis-Bacon Act
  • 41 U.S.C. chapter 67, also known as the Service Contract Act
  • Executive Order 11246 of September 24, 1965 (Equal Employment Opportunity)
  • Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
  • The Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1972 and the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974
  • The Family and Medical Leave Act
  • Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
  • The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
  • The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
  • Executive Order 13658 of February 12, 2014 (Establishing a Minimum Wage for Contractors)

In a significant victory for the government contracting community, a federal judge sitting in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas partially stayed the implementation of Executive Order 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” referred to in the government contracting community as the “Blacklisting Order.”  As discussed in more detail here, the Blacklisting Order would:

  1. Require government contractors to disclose “labor law violations” under fourteen different statutes and Executive Orders when bidding for or modifying contracts;
  2. Prohibit employers from entering into mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements with employees; and
  3. Require certain disclosures to independent contractors and employees concerning their employment status and information related to wages and hours worked.

When the White House issued the Executive Order, the government contracting community expressed concerns about the substantial burdens it would impose on businesses and noted that the Order seemed to exceed the limits of Executive power.  Judge Marcia Crone, a federal judge in Texas, agreed.  Late on October 24, 2016, Judge Crone issued a preliminary injunction blocking: (1) the labor law violations disclosure requirements and (2) the prohibition against entering into mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  The preliminary injunction applies to all federal contractors subject to the Executive Order and it blocks all aspects of the requirements and the implementing regulations, except the paycheck transparency provision.

The Plaintiffs, an association of government contractors in Texas, argued that the Executive Order and its implementing regulations and guidance exceeded Executive power and would impose irreparable harm on their businesses.  Judge Crone found the Plaintiffs’ arguments compelling with regard to the reporting and disclosure requirements and arbitration clause prohibitions, and stayed the implementation of those requirements.

In her decision, the Judge addressed several of the arguments raised by the contracting community Plaintiffs and the government Defendants.

  • The Judge found that the Executive Order and its implementing regulations and guidance likely exceeded the limits of Executive power.
  • She noted that fourteen statutes and Executive Orders of which the Blacklisting Order requires contractors to publicly disclose “violations” all have their own detailed enforcement mechanisms and penalties.
  • The Judge noted that under the Blacklisting Order, a contractor could face debarment or disqualification even if it was contesting a violation or over nothing more than the issuance of a citation by an individual government agency official.
  • Judge Crone also found persuasive the Plaintiffs’ arguments that the provisions of the Executive Order and Final Rule which restrict or prohibit certain mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the government’s general policy in favor of arbitration.
  • The Judge found the reporting and disclosure requirements to be “compelled speech” that likely violates the contractors’ First Amendment rights and also agreed that the Executive Order likely violates contractors’ Due Process rights by “compelling them to report and defend against non-final agency allegations of labor law violations without being entitled to a hearing at which to contest such allegations.”
  • Judge Crone found that the Executive Order is likely arbitrary and capricious “in view of the complex, cumbersome, and costly requirements . . . which hamper efficiency without quantifiable benefits.”

Although the contracting community’s victory is substantial, it was not complete, as Judge Crone left the paycheck transparency provisions to take effect on their regular schedule (starting on January 1, 2017).  The paycheck transparency provisions require that contractors with procurement contracts of $500,000 provide their employees with a document disclosing “the individual’s hours worked,  overtime hours, pay, and any additions made to or deductions made from pay.” For exempt employees, the document may omit information concerning overtime hours worked so long as the individual has been informed of his or her exempt status.  Covered contractors in states with equivalent paycheck transparency laws, such as New York and California, are deemed to be in compliance with the Executive Order’s requirements so long as they comply with their state’s paycheck transparency law.  Contractors should also be aware that there is always a possibility that the preliminary injunction may be lifted – whether by the Fifth Circuit or another federal court – and in that event, the reporting and disclosure requirements could be reinstated.  For that reason, covered contractors may wish to continue to collect data in case they find themselves once again subject to the reporting and disclosure obligations.

The request for – and subsequent partial granting of – a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of certain provisions of the Blacklisting Order is only the opening salvo in what is likely to be a long fight between the contracting community and the federal government.  As we discussed in our previous alert on the topic, multiple court challenges are possible, and the Blacklisting Order’s provisions may appear before Congress at some point.

Meanwhile, thanks to Judge Crone’s preliminary injunction, the reporting and disclosure requirements and the prohibition on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enjoined until further notice, while we continue to closely monitor developments.  Preliminary injunctions typically remain in effect at least until the conclusion of the underlying litigation.  The Plaintiffs may petition the court for the preliminary injunction to become permanent, blocking the government from enforcing the reporting and disclosure requirements and the prohibition on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements (unless the injunction is overturned).  Or the government Defendants may appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, perhaps paving the way for an ultimate ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The ultimate resolution of the contracting community’s concerns about the Blacklisting Order remains to be seen.  One thing is clear, however: while government contractors should be pleased with their victory in Texas, they must still plan to comply with the paycheck transparency provisions.  The contracting community has won the first battle, but the war over blacklisting continues.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the OFCCP & Affirmative Action Compliance Team, the OSHA Compliance, Enforcement & Litigation Team, or the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By Joshua D. Seidman and Tracy M. Billows

Seyfarth Synopsis: On November 8, 2016, two states — Washington and Arizona — are poised to become the sixth and seventh states in the country to pass a statewide mandatory paid sick leave law.

The noise surrounding the 2016 election’s major party candidates has left the American public full of both tension and hope heading into Election Day.  While many have been focusing on Tweets, video recordings, and alleged scandals, the paid sick leave epidemic that has spread throughout the nation in recent years has quietly infected this year’s election as well.  In particular, both Washington and Arizona have proposed statewide paid sick leave bills on their respective ballots.  When the Election Day dust settles, the country will not only know its Commander in Chief for the next four years, but also whether the number of statewide paid sick leave laws has increased from five to either six or seven.

The 2016 election would not be the first time a statewide paid sick leave law was passed through a ballot initiative.  In 2014, Massachusetts residents voted on and passed the state’s Earned Sick Time Law.

Washington Paid Sick Leave – Initiative Measure No. 1433

  • Paid Sick Leave Accrual, Usage, and Carryover:
    • Accrual Rate:  One hour of paid sick leave for every forty hours worked.
    • Accrual and Usage Caps:  The proposal currently is silent on whether there is any cap on how much paid sick leave employees can ultimately accrue and use in a single year.  Barring any further clarification from the state, if passed, the Washington proposal would be the first paid sick leave law in the country that does not set at least an accrual or usage cap.
    • Frontloading:  While frontloading paid sick time is expressly permitted under the proposed law, it may not get rid of an employer’s year-end carryover obligations.  The proposal states that providing paid sick leave in advance of accrual is permitted if the frontloading “meets or exceeds the requirements of this section for accrual, use, and carryover of paid sick leave.”
    • Carryover of Unused Paid Sick Leave:  Employers would only be required to allow 40 hours of earned, unused paid sick leave to carry over at year-end.
  • Reasons for Use:  Employees would be able to use earned paid sick leave for a number of reasons, including (a) their own injury, illness, or health condition, (b) the injury, illness, or health condition of a covered family member, (c) closure of the employee’s place of business or employee’s child’s school or place of care by order of a public official, and (d) certain absences related to domestic violence as set forth under the state’s Domestic Violence Leave law.  Covered family members would include, among other relationships, the employee’s children, parents, spouse, registered domestic partner, grandparents, grandchildren, and siblings.

Arizona Proposed Fair Wages and Health Families Act – Proposition 206

  • Paid Sick Leave Accrual, Usage, and Carryover:
    • Accrual Rate and Cap:  (a) Employers with 15 or more employees would be required to allow paid sick leave to accrue at least as fast as one hour for every 30 hours worked, up to 40 hours per year; (b) While the accrual rate remains the same for smaller employers, such employers would only be obligated to allow employees to accrue up to 24 hours of paid sick leave per year.
    • Usage Cap:  (a) Employers with 15 or more employees – 40 hours per year; (b) Employers with fewer than 15 employees – 24 hours per year.
    • Carryover:  The proposal states that earned paid sick time shall carry over from one year to the next, subject to the above usage cap limitations.  It is unclear from the current proposal if employers would be allowed to set a cap on how much unused sick time carries over at year-end.
    • Frontloading:  Employers would be able to get rid of their year-end carryover obligations if they (a) pay employees for unused paid sick leave at year-end, and (b) provide employees with a lump grant of sick time that is equal to the above amounts (depending on employer size).
  • Reasons for Use:  Employees would be able to use earned paid sick leave for a number of reasons, including (a) their own injury, illness, or health condition, (b) the injury, illness, or health condition of a covered family member, (c) closure of the employee’s place of business or employee’s child’s school or place of care by order of a public official, (d) care of the employee or a covered family member when it has been determined by health authorities that the individual’s presence in the community may jeopardize the health of others due to exposure to a communicable disease, and (e) certain absences related to domestic violence, sexual violence, abuse, or stalking of the employee or the employee’s covered family member.
  • Covered family members would include, among other relationships, an employee’s child (regardless of age), parent, spouse or registered domestic partner, grandparent, grandchild, and sibling, and any other individual related by blood or affinity whose close association with the employee is the equivalent of a family relationship.

Employers in Washington and Arizona should continue to track whether their states’ respective paid sick leave initiatives have passed.  And, if either initiative is approved, employers should begin taking steps as soon as possible to ensure that they will be able to achieve full compliance by the July 1, 2017 (Arizona) and January 1, 2018 (Washington) effective dates.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the Absence Management & Accommodations Team or the Workplace Policies and Handbooks Team.

By Michael Rybicki, Esq.

Seyfarth Summary: The relevance of the National Labor Relations Act to industries and business sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with its implications – such as hedge funds.

The New York Times recently ran on the front page of its business section a lengthy article discussing the National Labor Relation’s Board challenge to a number of provisions of an employment agreement that Bridgewater Associates, the world’s biggest hedge fund firm, requires each full-time employee to sign. Under the headline Confronting Wall Street’s Secretive Culture – N.L.R.B. Challenges Confidentiality Clauses, the article notes that the Board is challenging Bridgewater’s confidentiality, non-disparagement, and arbitration clauses and went on to state “[t]he unusual action is calling into question longstanding practices and prompting some companies to re-examine their employment agreements.”

With all deference to The Times, however, for a number of years the Board has been finding confidentiality provisions (see e.g., Target Corporation, 359 NLRB No. 103 (2013)) and non-disparagement clauses (see Dish Network Corporation, 359 NLRB No. 108 (2013)) unlawful and has steadfastly maintained, despite much criticism from the courts, that clauses restricting employees to arbitrating disputes are unlawful (D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 184 (2012)). If anything is “unusual” – if unsurprising – it is that the Board is going after a hedge fund.

Although many employers (and some of their attorneys) think that the application of the National Labor Relations Act is limited to union-represented employees or at least limited to union or union-related activities, such as collective bargaining, union organizing, or union strikes, hand billing, picketing, or boycotts, the Act’s coverage is much broader. As the Board’s website notes:

  • The NLRA applies to most private sector employers, including manufacturers, retailers, private universities, and health care facilities.
  • Employees at union and non-union workplaces have the right to help each other by sharing information, signing petitions and seeking to improve wages and working conditions in a variety of ways.See NLRB Website: FAQ’s.

The Complaint against Bridgewater (Case Number: 01-CA-169426 (06/30/2016)) is not the first one in the financial sector. For example, as Seyfarth Attorney Ashley Laken noted, the D.C. Circuit recently upheld the Board’s finding that the confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions of Quicken Loan’s employment agreements (see our earlier blog post here) violated the Act.

Confidentiality agreements, for example, can be drafted to lawfully prohibit the disclosure of a wide variety of confidential information, see e.g., GC MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, Case 7 (pp. 17-18) (a rule by a drugstore chain prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information lawful where the rule was clearly in the context of not disclosing personal health information); see also GC MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, p. 20 [Walmart, Case 11-CA-067171] (finding lawful a rule requiring employees to maintain the confidentiality of the employer’s trade secret and confidential information where rule was sufficiently contextualized by examples of prohibited disclosures (i.e., information regarding the development of systems, processes, products, know-how and technology, internal reports, policies, procedures or other internal business-related communications) for employees to understand that it does not reach protected communications about working conditions).

It seems reasonably clear, however, that too often the implications of the NLRA for industries and sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with issues arising under the Act are not considered. Further, even where they are at least considered, frequently all that is done is to include a so-called “savings clause,” stating in effect that nothing contained in an employment agreement, handbook, or work rule, shall be construed as restricting activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The Board, however, routinely finds such clauses ineffective. Chipotle Services LLC d/b/a Chipotle Mexican Grill, 364 NLRB No. 72 (2016); see also ISS Facility Services, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 160 (2016).

As noted, the National Labor Relations Act applies to most private sector employers, including industries and business sectors that have not traditionally had to deal with issues arising under its provisions. However, because it provides for only compensatory damages and generally does not offer the opportunity for attorney’s fees, it has generally been ignored by the Plaintiff’s Bar. But in today’s digital age, where employees can readily become aware of the Act’s scope via social media and online content providers, the Act’s implications need to be considered by almost all private sector employers when drafting employment agreements, handbooks, and work rules –  areas into which the Board clearly is looking to expand its effective reach.

 

By Benjamin D. Briggs, Adam R. Young, and Craig B. Simonsen

Seyfarth Synopsis: In a challenge brought by trade associations for the farm supply and fertilizer industries, the D.C. Circuit vacates OSHA memorandum narrowing the retail exemption from the PSM standard.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently ruled against OSHA on a Petition for Review of an OSHA interpretative memorandum in Agricultural Retailers Ass’n & Fertilizer Inst. v. United States Department of Labor, No. 15-1326 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2016).

In this case, the Agricultural Retailers Association and the Fertilizer Institute sought review of a July 22, 2015 OSHA memorandum and interim policy interpretation that had significantly narrowed the Retail Facilities Exemption to the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM) standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119.   The challenged interpretation had a dramatic effect on agricultural retailers that provide fertilizers to end users in the agricultural industry.  In that regard, the interpretation swept in many previously-exempt fertilizer and farm supply retailers into coverage under the onerous PSM standard.

OSHA issued the interpretation after a 2013 explosion at a West, Texas fertilizer supplier left 15 people dead and many others injured. Under the interpretation, OSHA retreated from the so-called “50 percent test” for determining whether a seller of highly hazardous chemicals qualified for the retail exemption.  Under that test, an establishment was exempt from PSM coverage if it “derived more than 50 percent of its income from direct sales of highly hazardous chemicals to the end user.”  Application of this test meant that fertilizer suppliers typically fell within the exemption despite having large quantities of highly hazardous chemicals at their establishments.  The challenged interpretation applied a different, much narrower, test to determine applicability of the exemption.  Under that test, retail facilities included only those “organized to sell merchandize in small quantities to the general public” as set forth sectors 44 and 45 of the NAICS Manual.  This definition precluded employers that sold or distributed large, bulk quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (i.e., farm and fertilizer supply businesses) from relying upon the retail exemption.

The thrust of the petitioners’ challenge to OSHA’s memorandum was that it was actually an OSHA standard, not an interpretation, and that, in turn, OSHA was required to follow rulemaking procedures, including notice-and-comment requirements. OSHA admittedly did not follow these procedures.  OSHA contended that rulemaking procedures did not apply because its action was a mere interpretation of a standard, and that its memorandum did not issue or modify a “standard.”  The D.C. Circuit rejected OSHA’s argument and agreed with petitioners.  In so doing, the court held that the memorandum amounted to a “standard within the meaning of the OSH Act” because its purpose was to correct “a particular significant risk,” rather than guide general enforcement.  Given that determination and OSHA’s admitted failure to follow rulemaking procedures, the court granted the petition and “vacated” OSHA’s memorandum.

For the time being, this means that employers (including agricultural retailers) may once again rely on the “50 percent rule” for determining applicability of the retail exemption to the PSM standard. How long that reprieve lasts remains to be seen given OSHA’s apparent commitment to this issue, but one thing is clear — any future change to the retail exemption will afford stakeholders the opportunity to be heard through notice-and-comment procedures.

In the meantime, we will continue to monitor and keep you updated on this issue as it develops.

For more information on this or any related topic please contact the authors, your Seyfarth attorney, or any member of the OSHA Compliance, Enforcement & Litigation Team.

 

 

By David J. Rowland

Seyfarth Synopsis: A divided panel of the Eighth Circuit recently decided that an employer may be required to assume or infer from the circumstances that an employee is seeking a reasonable accommodation – even when no affirmative request is made.

The courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have made clear for decades that an employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) is not triggered until the employee seeking reasonable accommodation actually requests assistance.

To quote a recent case decided by the EEOC: “generally an individual with a disability must request a reasonable accommodation by letting the [employer] know the individual needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition” Adina P. v. Brennan, 2016 EEOPUB LEXIS 336 (EEOC 2016).  To be sure, no “magic words” have been required and no court would expect each employee to ask for a “reasonable accommodation” by those words, but, until now, courts have uniformly required that an employee at least indicate that she wants help or assistance because of a disability.

Earlier this month, though, a divided panel of the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, lowered the bar substantially and held that a jury should determine whether an employee requested a reasonable accommodation by simply notifying her supervisor that she could not obtain a required CPR certification until after she completed physical therapy. See Kowitz v. Trinity Health, et al., Case No. 15-1584 (8th Cir. October 17, 2016). The employee never asked to be given extra time to complete the certification, nor to be transferred to another position that did not require CPR certification.  Still, the majority held that a reasonable jury could find that the employer “understood” the employee’s communications to be a request for accommodation. Id. at p. 9, n. 1.

The dissenting judge reiterated the point that virtually every employer would assume to be true: “an employee who wants additional assistance cannot ‘expect the employer to read her mind and know she secretly wanted a particular accommodation and then sue the employer for not providing it” Id. at p.12 (citation omitted).

Blurring a Bright Line

Thus, what was a bright line rule has been blurred, but, as usual, the particular facts of the case may have driven the majority to this hand-scratcher of a result.

The plaintiff was a respiratory therapist with cervical spinal stenosis, She had undergone surgery, and had returned to work on October 19, 2010 with the restriction of a reduced schedule until November 29, 2010 (yes, the dates may be important).   In the meantime, on November 19, 2010, her supervisor posted a memo directing all of the respiratory therapy department’s employees to provide updated copies of their basic life support (BSR) certifications by November 26 and added :”If you are not up to date you will need to submit a letter indicating why you are not up to date and the date you are scheduled to take the BSR class”.

On November 30, having already passed the written component of the BSR test, the employee wrote a letter to her supervisor indicating that she “will not to be able to do the physical part of the BSR” until cleared by her doctor, with whom she had an appointment on December 2 and also thanked the supervisor “for understanding [her] condition”. On December 2, the employee’s doctor opined that she could not take the physical portion of the BSR test until she had completed at least four additional months of therapy.  The employee left a voicemail with the supervisor that evening.  The very next day, December 3, she was terminated for failing to provide the certification.

This sequence of events (and perhaps the seemingly harsh and abrupt decision to terminate) lead the majority to conclude that the employee’s written notification of the need for clearance and her follow-up communication about needing four months of therapy “could readily have been understood to constitute a request for reasonable accommodation”. Id. at 9.

Bad facts often make for bad law, and many employers in the same circumstances would have taken the logical step of engaging the employee in an interactive dialogue. But, as the dissent rightly noted,  the idea that there can be such a thing as an implied or understood  request for accommodation generates “regrettable uncertainty” by “eliminating the requirement of a clear request for accommodation”.  Id. at 13.

Employers take heed: a request for reasonable accommodation may be implied by the circumstances in some instances.  As a result, it is more dangerous than ever to ignore the warning signs that an employee is seeking help.

For more information on this topic, please contact the author, your Seyfarth Attorney or a member of the Firm’s Absence Management and Accommodations Team.